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I. INTRODUCTION
Thousands of times a day, in hospitals and physicians' offices
throughout the country, patients or their surrogate decisionmakers de-
cide to accept or refuse suggested diagnostic or therapeutic procedures.
Only in a very small number of instances where the patient or his surro-
gate decides to decline the proposed treatment, does the treating physi-
cian or the hospital file a legal action seeking to overturn the decision.
* Visiting Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. B.A. 1969,
DePauw University; J.D. 1973, Washington University. I wish to thank Sheila K. Hyatt,
Professor of Law, University of Denver and Kathleen Mills for helpful comments on a
previous draft of this article.
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Judicial opinion's in these cases warrant our close scrutiny because of
their far-reaching effect. The fact that these cases are brought by health-
care providers and decided by judges in the name of beneficence 1 is no
reason to accord them any less attention.
2
In this article I will argue that the concepts of privacy and autonomy
are both literally and constitutionally involved in healthcare decision-
making. Their application in that context has been complicated by a
number of factors. Privacy, in particular, has longstanding recognition
in tort law,3 as well as in constitutional law, at least with regard to the
fourth amendment; however, since the recognition of a separate and dis-
tinct right of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut,4 the concepts of auton-
omy and privacy have been used interchangeably. I shall illustrate that,
at least in the context of treatment refusals, autonomy and privacy in the
constitutional sense should be treated separately.
The tide of this article is not intended to be polemical, but strongly
suggestive of the fact that there has been an assault on privacy in health-
care decisionmaking. 5 I intend to show the means necessary to defeat
this assault, which exist within the currently accepted principles of con-
tract, procedural and constitutional law. First, I will explore the funda-
mentally contractual nature of the physician-patient relationship and
demonstrate that the legal implications of that relationship have either
been dismissed or intentionally disregarded in most, if not all, of the
treatment-refusal cases. Second, I will elucidate the four state interests
and the questionable procedural posture in which they become decisive
factors in the outcome of treatment refusal cases. I will argue that an
appropriately rigorous application of the concepts of justiciability and
case and controversy, as well as the rules of procedure applicable to de-
termination of the real party in interest, would significantly reduce the
number of cases decided by the courts. At the very least, such applica-
tion would compel the state to ensure the responsibility for asserting its
interests as an actual party to such litigation. Thirdly, I will elucidate
1. Beneficence is a bioethical term indicating a focus on whether the giving or with-
holding of a particular treatment would be in the patient's best interest. It is often utilized
in contradistinction to autonomy in situations in which the patient's actual wishes cannot
be communicated or otherwise determined. For a thorough analysis and discussion of the
principle of beneficence see T. BEAucHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 194-255(3d ed. 1989).
2. As Justice Brandeis observed: "Experience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent .... [For] [t]he
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting), overruled by, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 51 (1967).
3. Seegenerally PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 849-869 (5th ed. 1984) (on
the Right of Privacy).
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. Among those commentators whose recent works support the thesis of this article
are: Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court Ordered Caesareans, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1951 (1986); Johnson, From Medicalization to Legalization to Politicization:
O'Connor, Cruzan, and the Refusal of Treatment in the 1990s, 21 CONN. L. REV. 685 (1989);
Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REV. 375 (1988); and Nelson, Buggy &
Weil, Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the
Rest, 37 HASTINGS LJ. 703 (1986).
[Vol. 68:1
1991] PRIVACY IN HEALTHCARE DECISIONMAKING 3
and critique the state interests and the questionable manner in which
they become decisive factors in the outcome of treatment-refusal cases.
Finally, I will make the case for a constitutional right to privacy in
healthcare decisionmaking that distinguishes privacy from autonomy.
This approach protects those who are temporarily or permanently men-
tally incapacitated from unwarranted governmental intrusion and pre-
serves the proper role of the family.
As a frame of reference for this analysis, I propose the following
hypothetical factual situation: A thirty-eight year old male with a wife
not employed outside the home and two minor children presents to his
physician with a number of physical complaints that have become in-
creasingly troublesome during the past few months. The physician per-
forms a battery of diagnostic procedures which lead to a conclusive
diagnosis of intermediate stage Hodgkins disease. 6 The patient's prog-
nosis is presented to him in the following manner. If he immediately
submits to intensive chemotherapy, there is a sixty to seventy percent
likelihood of complete remission in nine to twelve months. Without this
treatment regimen, there is a ninety percent probability that he will not
survive more than eighteen months.
The patient gives full and complete consideration to all of the rele-
vant information provided by his physician, discusses the matter at
length with his wife and adult parents who live in the same community,
and then advises his physician that he declines to undergo the therapy.
The patient submits a letter of resignation to his employer and prepares
to devote the remaining months or years of his life to quality time with
his family.
Upon receiving this declaration from his patient, and having failed
in his repeated efforts to dissuade the patient from a course of inaction,
the physician contacts the attorney who provides legal services to his
clinic. The physician files an action in a state court of general jurisdic-
tion seeking an order "compelling the patient to submit involuntarily to
the chemotherapy deemed necessary by competent medical authority to
save his life and prevent the wanton, willful, and malicious abandonment
of his dependents."
The distinctions between the hypothetical situation and the factual
background of most reported cases are as follows: 1) the patient is not
currently hospitalized; 2) the patient's refusal of treatment is unequivo-
cal and not based on any alleged incapacity to understand and appreci-
ate the consequences; and 3) the patient's refusal of treatment is not the
product of religious scruples. I will argue, however, that in light of the
applicable substantive and procedural principles, none of these distinc-
tions should have a material impact upon the outcome of the legal
proceeding.
7
6. Hodgkins disease involves malignant tumors of the immune system. For a thor-
ough discussion of the epidemiology, etiology, natural history, clinical manifestations, and
treatment, see HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1555-60 (11 th ed. 1987).
7. Another factor which may influence the ultimate disposition of the case is the pa-
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II. THE NATURE OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
A. Implied Contract
How the physician-patient relationship is characterized varies with
the orientation of the person making the characterization. From the
standpoint of a legal analysis, there is virtual unanimity of opinion that
the essential nature of the relationship is contractual. 8 In the typical
physician-patient relationship the contract is established by implication
when the patient visits the physician complaining of some ailment and
the physician performs an examination usually coupled with other diag-
nostic procedures in order to determine the cause of the symptoms. At
this point the only written evidence of a contractual relationship is a few
standard forms which indicate the essential aspects of the patient's med-
ical history and the nature of his insurance coverage. There has proba-
bly been no discussion between physician and patient of important
matters such as the physician's customary charges, the patient's religious
or philosophical views that might impact upon modes of treatment, re-
spective views on informed consent and the nature and extent of the
information to be exchanged in the process of medical decisionmaking,
or other issues that may have life and death implications for the patient.
The amorphous nature of this unwritten contract is rooted in the
historically paternalistic nature of the relationship. 9 In the past, the pa-
tient sought out the physician in much the same way as the New Age
pilgrim approaches the guru, in a posture of awe, reverence, and sub-
mission. The physician unilaterally defined the nature and conditions of
the relationship. The role of the patient was limited to answering the
physician's questions, strictly adhering to his admonitions, and seeing to
it that the charges for his professional services were promptly paid.
There is much ongoing debate as to the extent to which society has
moved away from this paternalistic model;' 0 however, with the excep-
tion of a few cases having to do with refusal of treatment by women in
the third trimester of pregnancy, I the appellate decisions in all jurisdic-
tions uphold the legal right of the competent patient to accept all, some
tient's gender. A recent article has analyzed "all appellate-level, civil, state 'right-to-die'
cases involving incompetent, adult patients" and concluded that gender profoundly affects
judicial analysis of right-to-die cases. Miles & August, Courts, Gender and 'The Right to Die',
18 LAw, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE 85 (1990).
8. See, e.g., S. FISCINA, MEDICAL LAw FOR THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN: A CASE ORI-
ENTED ANALYSIS 3-8 (1982); A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAw 1-7 (2d ed. 1978).
9. Thomasma, Beyond Medical Paternalism and Patient Autonomy: A Model of Physician Con-
science for the Physician-Patient Relationship, in BIOETHICS: READINGS AND CASES 113 (B. Brody
& H. Engelhardt 1987).
10. One of the most articulate and persuasive works that addresses this subject is J.
KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984). Although the overall topic of
this work is the doctrine of informed consent, Professor Katz, a physician, carefully expli-
cates the paternalistic nature of the physician-patient relationship and convincingly estab-
lishes it as the basis for the late and grudging acceptance among the medical profession of
the "shared decisionmaking" approach to the physician-patient encounter.
11. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981);
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
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or none of the physician's recommendations unless a countervailing
state interest is found to be superseding.
12
As with most other contractual relationships, that between physi-
cian and patient is mutually revocable. The patient can, without ques-
tion, withdraw from and terminate the relationship at any time with
payment for services rendered to date as the only obligation; however,
in recognition of the special vulnerability of a patient in need of medical
care, the physician's ability unilaterally to terminate the relationship is
significantly more circumscribed. If the physician is to avoid being sub-
ject to an allegation of patient abandonment, he must give the patient
reasonable notice of his withdrawal, assist the patient in securing an-
other physician, and provide essential treatment to the patient for an
interim period of reasonable duration. 13
B. Fiduciary Relationship
The wide disparity of knowledge and experience in medical matters
between physician and patient justifies the characterization of the rela-
tionship as fiduciary. A recognition of this disparity and an effort to re-
dress the imbalance is found in the evolving doctrine of informed
consent. 14 Before a physician can undertake any mode of diagnosis or
treatment that involves significant risks, he must first provide the patient
with a package of relevant information regarding such things as the na-
ture and purpose of the procedure or treatment, its anticipated risks,
benefits, and consequences, the feasible alternative procedures and
treatments and their risks, benefits, and consequences, and the conse-
quences to the patient if nothing is done. 15 There have been a signifi-
cant number of medical malpractice cases in which the major issue was
the alleged failure of the physician to provide the patient with the appro-
priate amount of information so as to render his consent truly "in-
formed."' 6 The legal recognition of the applicability of the doctrine of
informed consent to the physician-patient relationship suggests that
shared decisionmaking should replace paternalistic decisionmaking. 17
The actions of the physician in our hypothetical case, as well as actual
12. See, e.g., A. MEISEL, THE RxGHT TO DIE 45-46 (1989).
13. See S. FiSCINA, supra note 8, at 19-30 and A. HOLDER, supra note 8, at 372-389.
14. There is a wealth of literature on the subject of informed consent. For this reason,
I will eschew a detailed discussion and analysis of the doctrine, and refer the reader to the
following recent and comprehensive treatments of the subject. F. RozovsKY, CONSENT TO
TREATMENT. A PRACTICAL GUIDE (2d ed. 1990); R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY
AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986); A. RoSOFF, INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS (1981).
In addition to reducing the knowledge gap between physician and patient, the doc-
trine of informed consent (and hence refusal) is a judicial assertion that the principle of
patient autonomy, rather than physician paternalism, should govern the relationship.
15. A. RosOFF, supra note 14, at 318.
16. An exhaustive list of the cases would be neither useful nor practical; however, the
following cases discuss the major considerations: Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir.), cerL. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal Rptr.
505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, reh'g denied, 187
Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
17. Paul Ramsey, a medical ethicist, argues that the proper characterization of the
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cases discussed in section III infra, demonstrate the persistent paternal-
istic perception of the relationship by many physicians.' 8
C. Confidentiality and Privacy
Another significant feature of the physician-patient relationship is
the patient's expectation of confidentiality. The law recognizes and re-
inforces this expectation in a number of ways. The records which docu-
ment the patient's care and treatment, whether they are in the custody of
the individual physician or a hospital, are deemed confidential. Only
with the written consent of the patient may any portion of the records be
made available to a third person. Furthermore, in almost every jurisdic-
tion there is a statutory recognition of the physician-patient privilege
which provides that the physician may not be required to divulge private
and personal information about his patient without that patient's prior
consent.19 There are limited exceptions to the rule, of course, such as
when the patient is a party to the litigation and may reasonably be pre-
sumed to have put his medical condition or the particulars of the medi-
cal care and treatment in issue. Additional exceptions to the general
rule of confidentiality are statutory reporting requirements in circum-
stances such as contagious disease, wounds inflicted by deadly weapons,
and child abuse. These latter exceptions are clearly instances in which
certain societal interests have been deemed so significant as to override
the patient's need for and expectation of privacy.
20
physician-patient relationship is that of partnership rather than contract. His reasoning is
as follows:
I suggest that men's capacity to become joint adventurers in a common cause
makes possible a consent to enter the relation of patient to physician .... This
means that partnership is a better term than contract in conceptualizing the relation
between patient and physician.... The fact that these.., people are joint adven-
turers is evident from the fact that consent is a continuing and repeatable require-
ment. We can legitimately appeal to permissions presumably granted by or
implied in the original contact only to the extent that these are not incompatible
with the demands of an ongoing partnership sustained by an actual or implied
present consent and terminable by any present or future dissent from it. For this to
be at all a human enterprise-a covenantal relation between the man who per-
forms these procedures and the man who is patient in them-the latter must
make a reasonably free and an adequately informed consent. Ideally, he must be
constantly engaged in doing so. This is basic to the cooperative enterprise in
which he is one partner.
P. RAMSEY, THE PATENT AS PERSON 6 (1970).
18. Although many fine opinions have been written by judges in medical malpractice
cases alleging a lack of informed consent, this purported judicial recognition of a person's
dominion over his own body shrinks to virtual invisibility in the treatment-refusal cases.
19. The Colorado statute is typical. It provides generally that:
A physician, surgeon, or registered professional nurse duly authorized to practice
his profession pursuant to the laws of this state or any other state shall not be
examined without the consent of his patient as to any information acquired in
attending the patient which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for
the patient ....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(l)(d) (1987). The statute creates certain exceptions, such
as when the healthcare provider is sued for malpractice by the patient, or when the pro-
vider's clinical services are under review by appropriate administrative agencies charged
with insuring professional competence.
20. Perhaps the furthest extension of the duty of a physician to disclose what would
otherwise be privileged and confidential aspects of his relationship to a patient is the line
[Vol. 68:1I
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Except for the situations mentioned above, government's role has
been to foster and protect the relationship between physician and pa-
tient. State licensing requirements protect the public from unskilled or
incompetent physicians, and Medicaid, Medicare and medical indigence
legislation promotes the formation of the physician-patient relationship
by subsidizing the cost of care to disadvantaged groups of citizens.
None of this suggests, however, either the right or the responsibility of
government or society to dictate the terms of the relationship between
the individual patient and his physician.
2 1
The fact that today a much larger portion of physician-patient en-
counters take place in hospitals than ever before does not, as a matter of
law, alter the privileged nature of the relationship. In a major medical
center the individual practitioner is augmented by a "team" comprised
of an attending physician from one or more departments, senior and
junior residents, staff nurses, technologists, therapists, and social work-
ers.22 The inclusion of these additional parties facilitates the relation-
ship between the primary attending physician and the patient. It does
not, however, diminish the patient's right to and expectations of privacy,
confidentiality and autonomy.
23
When a physician seeks to override a competent patient's refusal to
consent to a recommended treatment, he breaches the privacy and con-
fidentiality of the relationship. Challenging a patient's decision involves
filing a petition with the court documenting the patient's medical condi-
tion. Unless special procedures are followed, private and personal in-
formation about the patient becomes a matter of public record. Beyond
the pure legalities of this breach of an implicit element of privacy and
confidentiality, the psychological impact upon the interpersonal dynam-
of cases flowing from Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976), in which an imminent threat of harm to an identifiable
individual was communicated to a psychiatrist. The physician, in such a situation, was held
to have a duty to warn the person at risk, or appropriate authorities, which took prece-
dence over patient confidentiality.
21. Leon Kass, a physician and bioethicist, emphasizes two important aspects of the
physician-patient relationship. First, that it encompasses the "intimate life-world" of the
patient which includes the family or household. Second, that the patient adrits this pro-
fessional stranger into his"life-world" in the hope of a cure, and upon the condition
"that he keeps private what he sees and hears." L. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL Sci-
ENCE: BIOLoGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS, 237-38 (1985).
22. See Rich, Malpractice Issues in the Academic Medical Center, 13 J.C.U.L. 149, 153-56
(1986).
23. As medical care has become more technologically complex, tort law has attempted
to adapt by recognizing the changed circumstances. For example, the "Captain of the
Ship" doctrine, which holds that the surgeon in the operating room is ultimately responsi-
ble for the acts and omissions of the entire surgical team, including the anesthesiologist,
has all but disappeared in recognition of the independent roles and responsibilities of each
member of the surgical team. But see Schultz v. Mutch, 165 Cal. App. 3d 66, 211 Cal. Rptr.
445 (1985). Also, the doctrine of "corporate negligence" was created in recognition of the
fact that the modem hospital is not simply a building in which physicians treat their pa-
tients. Rather, it is a corporate entity that undertakes separate and independent responsi-
bilities toward patients who are admitted by members of its medical staff. Johnson v.
Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981); Darling v.
Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 946 (1966).
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ics of the relationship is devastating. How can the requisite mutual trust
and confidence ever be restored when the physician takes an adversarial
posture with regard to his patient?24
There is an exquisite irony in such scenarios when one considers
the antipathy that physicians have historically demonstrated for lawyers
and judges. Physicians have taken the position that the law should stay
out of the medical practice, that the physician-patient relationship is an
area in which the law is neither competent, sensitive, nor has legitimate
authority. Despite such uniformly expressed protestations, over the last
three decades a growing number of physicians have invoked the legal
process when the intransigence of their own patients differs from the
technological imperative of modem medical practice.2 5 The Hippo-
cratic admonition: "Above all else do no harm" has been amended to
read: "Above all else do something," even if you must breach the confi-
dentiality of the relationship, transform your patient into a legal adver-
sary, and write your prescription in the form of a court order for
treatment against the patient's will.
What motivates the physician who seeks to impose treatment upon
a non-consenting patient? Surely, the sociological phenomenon of em-
ploying a remedial measure simply because it exists (Technological Im-
perative) is an insufficient explanation. Modem physicians are more
than simply technocrats. The reason most often mentioned by individ-
ual physicians and hospital administrators (hospitals are often the peti-
tioners in such proceedings), is the fear of a subsequent malpractice
claim by a member of the patient's family.2 6 The gravamen of such a
24. The evils of coercive medical practice, made possible through the agency of the
judiciary in treatment refusal cases, are the same as the evils of coercive legislation enacted
for the allegedly noble purpose of maintaining the moral fiber of society. Physicians, in
practicing their art, are supposed to be guided by compassion for the patient and his con-
dition. Yet, as Michael Perry has observed:
To coerce someone to make a choice she does not want to make is to cause her to
suffer. [C]oercing someone to do something she not merely does not want to do,
but believes destructive of her well-being to do, even forbidden for her to do...
causes extreme suffering. And extreme resentment. A moral community that val-
ues individual conscientiousness or personal integrity-that believes that ulti-
mately, after careful, informed deliberation, a person should choose on the basis
of conscience-will be wary, therefore, about pursuing a legislative strategy of
extreme coercion.
M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAw: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 100-01 (1988).
25. Eric Fromm posits two principles of the technological system or "technetronic
society," the first of which is the maxim that "something ought to be done because it is
technically possible to do it." Fromm also credits a paper by Hasan Ozbekhan entitled "The
Triumph of Technology: 'Can' Implies 'Ought,'" for this lucid observation of the phe-
nomenon: "Thus, feasibility, which is a strategic concept, becomes elevated into a norma-
tive concept, with the result that whatever technological reality indicates we can do is taken
as implying that we must do it." E. FROMM, THE REVOLUTION OF HOPE: TOWARD A HUMAN-
IZED TECHNOLOGY 33-34 (1968).
For a discussion of the operation of the principle in the medical context, see R. WEIR,
ABATING TREATMENT wrrH CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTs 30-33 (1989).
26. Professor Alexander Capron, in a recent article adapted from a presentation to
the National Conference of the State Judiciary on Bioethical Issues, addresses this
concern:
Frankly, this fear seems greatly exaggerated.... First, if informed decisionmaking
has occurred.., there is little likelihood of a suit being brought and even less of
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civil suit would be that the patient was "incapacitated" to such an extent
that his refusal of consent was not valid. Thus the failure of the health-
care providers to recognize this situation and obtain judicially-approved,
substituted consent resulted in harm to the patient for which they could
be held liable in damages.
Undermining this "justification," however is the fact that most of
the refusal-of-treatment cases, regardless of whether they involve com-
petent or allegedly incapacitated patients, do not end with a ruling by a
trial court judge, even when the healthcare provider brings the action.
The losing healthcare provider regularly appeals these cases to the high-
est court of the jurisdiction. 27 Such prosecutorial zeal can hardly be ex-
plained by a fear of malpractice claims, for surely a trial court ruling
upholding the patient's refusal of treatment would constitute an ade-
quate defense to any such suit and would be an even more compelling
defense to criminal prosecution. 28 Furthermore, concern over future
litigation cannot legally or ethically justify seeking to override a compe-
tent patient's refusal of consent any more than it would justify "dump-
ing" a patient in dire condition on another hospital.
29
Another argument physicians assert in justification for taking their
patients to court to seek authorization of treatment in the face of an
informed refusal is that not to do so would violate the Hippocratic Oath
and assist the patient in suicide. The Hippocratic Oath portrays the
physician as a benign, authoritarian, paternalistic decisionmaker who
takes full responsibility for determining what the patient requires in the
way of medical care. It contains no recognition that the patient has any
decisionmaking role in determining his medical fate.3 0 This anachronis-
tic view of medical decisionmaking has clearly been superseded by the
common law of informed consent and therefore cannot reasonably be
asserted by physicians as justification for litigating treatment refusals by
patients.3 '
its succeeding. As for the risk of criminal prosecution, physicians are never con-
victed for carrying out decisions mutually made with qualified surrogates, much
less patients. Thus, there should be little cause for judges to intervene simply to
dispense advance absolution for health care providers.
Capron, The Burden of Decision, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 37 (1990).
27. See, e.g., Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 551 N.E.2d 77, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876
(1990); In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534
N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
28. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
29. "Dumping" is a new term of art in health care delivery referring to the practice of
private hospitals which do not want to render necessary treatment to uninsured or under-
insured patients inappropriately transferring them to public hospitals in the area. The
practice became so widespread that Congress enacted federal anti-dumping legislation as
part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub. L.
No. 99-272, § 9121, 100 Star. 82, 164-67 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1986)). For a
discussion of the patient-dumping phenomenon and the effects of COBRA, see Enfield &
Sklar, Patient Dumping in the Hospital Emergency Department: Renewed Interest in an Old Problem,
13 AM. J.L. & MED. 561 (1988).
30. E. PELLEGRINO & D. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF
BENEFICENCE IN HEALTHCARE 4 (1988).
31. Faden and Beauchamp observe that:
[M]edicine was jolted from an exclusive preoccupation with a beneficence model
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As for the notion that accepting the patient's decision would be tan-
tamount to assisting suicide, the American Medical Association and ma-
jor medical specialty organizations have promulgated ethical rulings and
other statements of principle to the effect that the withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment does not constitute homicide, sui-
cide, or aiding, abetting or assisting suicide, and that rather, the
underlying disease process is the ultimate cause of the patient's death.
3 2
Furthermore, in situations where the attending physician is uncomforta-
ble with following the patient's decision the patient can usually be trans-
ferred to a physician who can abide by the patient's wishes.
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT REFUSAL CASES
Customarily, when an individual or an entity initiates a legal action
against another individual or entity, the purpose is to endorse a legal
right that the plaintiff has vis-a-vis the defendant. Except for instances
in which one party is legally empowered to bring an action on behalf of
another, such as a parent on behalf of a child or a guardian on behalf of
an incompetent, courts will dismiss a legal action which is not prose-
cuted by "the real party in interest."'5 3 The treatment refusal cases,
however, constitute a curious exception to this general principle of the
law of civil procedure. In most of these cases, the healthcare provider
does not assert per se a legal right to treat the patient over her objection
or a legal duty on the part of the patient to submit to the treatment
directives of the healthcare provider. The reason they do not will be
discussed later in this section. Rather, the health care provider purports
to assert certain interests of the state that may override the common law
and constitutional (state & federal) rights of the patient to refuse treat-
ment. Because of the pivotal role these interests play in the judicial
analysis and outcome of treatment refusal cases, I will analyze them at
some length in the first part of this section. I will then discuss the pro-
cess by which courts transform treatment refusal cases into actions
which balance certain state interests against the patient's privacy and au-
tonomy interests. It is important to remember that such cases typically
arise in one of two formats. Either the physician or the healthcare insti-
to awareness of an autonomy model of responsibility for the patient. Physicians
had heretofore considered the physician-patient relationship by beginning from
the patient's submission to the physician's professional beneficence. The law en-
larged that perspective by viewing the relationship within a wider social frame-
work, emphasizing instead that patients voluntarily initiate the relationship and
have the right to define its boundaries to fit their own ends.
R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at 142-43.
32. See e.g. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON
ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS § 2.18 (1986).
33. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) provides in pertinent part that:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.... No
action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of,
the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have
the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party
in interest.
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tution as plaintiff seeks a court order authorizing treatment over the de-
fendant patient's objection, or the patient as plaintiff seeks a court order
requiring the defendant healthcare provider to honor the patient's re-
fusal of treatment. My position is that there are significant procedural
infirmities which should preclude the courts from granting the relief
sought by the plaintiff in the former situation, and substantive infirmities
which should preclude the courts from denying the relief sought in the
latter situation.
Courts circumvent these infirmities by balancing the interests of the
patient and the state. Since in most cases the courts do so without the
state being a party to the litigation, I argue that this approach is contrary
to the fundamental procedural law and inures to the detriment of the
patient. Throughout the section I also highlight procedural tools avail-
able to the patient and her counsel when attempting to slow-down and
reverse the juggernaut that treatment refusal cases tend to become.
A. The Four State Interests
1. Origins of the Interests
The case most often cited for the existence, identity and applicabil-
ity of overriding state interests is Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz;34 however, as in many other cases that cite it as authority,
Saikewicz merely names the four interests without giving any historical,
philosophical, or legal analysis. It then proceeds to apply them to the
facts of the case at bar. Although many commentators have correctly
pointed out that in the case of a competent adult these state interests
rarely prevail, only one commentator has seriously challenged their ac-
tual validity or applicability.
3 5
It has also been suggested that Saikewicz actually derived the four
state interests from the Georgetown College case.3 6 Certainly Judge Skelly
34. 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977). The four state interests are: "(1)
the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the
prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession."
This case involved a profoundly retarded, non-verbal 67 year old man. He suffered these
afflictions all of his life. After being diagnosed with leukemia, chemotherapy was recom-
mended by his physician. Although the court acknowledged that the average person
would, in all likelihood, consent to the treatment, in Mr. Saikewicz's situation it was held to
be inappropriate. Several factors influenced the court's decision: the patient would not
understand the nature and purpose of the treatment, and therefore, would probably resist
it; the pain, nausea and vomiting it would engender would appear to Mr. Saikewicz as
torture; and even with the treatment the prognosis was very poor - only a 30% to 50%
chance of a brief remission.
Although this case is heavily relied upon for the application of the four state interests
in treatment refusal cases, the reasoning of the court in applying a substituted judgment
standard to a patient who has never been competent has generated unprecedented criti-
cism-both in terms of volume and harshness-in the literature. See, e.g., Ramsey, The
Saikewicz Precedent: What's Goodfor an Incompetent Patient, 8 Hastings Center Rep., Dec. 1978,
at 36, 39.
35. Oberman, Withdrawal of Life Support: Individual Autonomy Against Alleged State Interests
in Preserving Life, 20 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 797 (1989).
36. Morgan & Harty-Golder, Constitutional Development ofJudicial Criteria in Right-to-Die
Cases: From Brain Dead to Persistent Vegetative State, 23 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 721, 736 (1988).
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Wright, in his opinion supporting the order of the transfusion over the
patient's objection, justifies his ruling by the parens patriae power of the
state. This power protects the lives of children and adults whose capac-
ity to make decisions is impaired. Further, it promotes society's legal
and moral sanctions against suicide. Additionally, it facilitates the
state's interest in preventing parents from abandoning their minor
children.
3 7
While the doctrine of physician-patient privilege provided a basis
for Judge Wright's decision, the urgent circumstances of the case clearly
precluded a careful study of the legitimacy of the state's interests in this
situation. It is evident that these circumstances played a role in Judge
Wright's decision. In reviewingJudge Wright's decision, Judge Miller of
the court of appeals stated:
[Judge Wright was] ... impelled, I am sure, by humanitarian
impulses and doubtless was himself under considerable strain
.... In the interval of about an hour and twenty minutes be-
tween the appearance of the attorneys at his chambers and the
signing of the order at the hospital, the judge had no opportu-
nity for research as to the substantive legal problems and pro-
cedural questions involved. He should not have been asked to
act in these circumstances.
3 8
Sadly, many appellate courts have reviewed similar hasty trial court rul-
ings and have not bothered carefully and critically to analyze the dubi-
ous origins of these four state interests which remain obstacles to
patients who wish to refuse necessary medical treatment.
3 9
The moral and political basis of government in the United States is
indisputably the promotion of respect for and protection of each citi-
zen's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 40 Cases such as
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,4 1 upholding compulsory vaccination against
smallpox, limit a person's right to refuse medical "treatment" on the
grounds that the general public safety and welfare would be unreasona-
blyjeopardized.4 2 Conversely, there are no public health, safety, or wel-
37. In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1007-09 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Jones v. President of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
38. Id. at 1014. In treatment refusal cases there appears to be ajudicial imperative to
act that parallels the medical one. It seems that judges, like the physicians who petition
them, all too readily succumb to the admonition "above all else, do something." Cf. infra
notes 76 and 77 and accompanying text.
39. This includes the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cruzan, which lists and gives
constitutional stature to these interests without critical analysis or discussion. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1990).
40. Declaration of Independence.
41. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
42. The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable con-
ditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the
safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community. Even liberty
itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's
own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal
enjoyment of the same right by others.
Id. at 26-27 (Emphasis added) (quoting Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)).
It is interesting to note, in the context of the discussion of forcing treatment on unwilling
patients, that the Supreme Court prioritized liberty, not life, as the greatest of all rights.
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fare issues raised when an individual patient declines treatment
proffered by a healthcare provider.
2. Preserving Life
The first state interest is said to be that of "preserving life" or, us-
ing the ecclesiastical phraseology, maintaining the sanctity of life. This
interest involves two separate but related concerns. The first is an inter-
est in preserving the life of the particular patient in the case at bar; the
second is a more generalized interest in maintaining the sanctity of all
life.43 The implicit assumption justifying this state interest as one which
must be considered in treatment refusal cases, is that if the state, through
its licensed medical practitioners, hospitals and courts, allowed patients
to decide to refuse life-sustaining treatment, it would inevitably result in
a widespread trend which would ultimately undermine the proposition
that life is sacred. Without invading the province of the next section of
this article, it is important to note the implications of judicially con-
fronting a patient who has refused a recommended medical therapy af-
ter due and informed deliberation with the long term societal
implications of this most private and personal decision. By introducing
this element into the equation, the courts are asserting that a competent
adult may be commandeered into service as living proof of his govern-
ment's regard for life by being forced to undergo treatment that she has
consciously rejected.44 To do so, even in only one case out of a hun-
dred, is to violate the fundamental Kantian principle that individuals are
to be treated as ends and not as means.
4 5
Certainly those who question the legitimacy of and beneficent moti-
vation for asserting such a countervailing state interest could take some
comfort if the courts were openly to refuse to discuss the state's interest
in the sanctity of life on the ground that it did not apply to at least some
portion of treatment-refusal cases. There are, however, no reported de-
cisions in which a court has refused to accept jurisdiction on the
grounds that a private physician has no legal right to force treatment on
a competent patient, or that the state is not a party to the proceeding so
as to properly invoke either the parens patriae power or the four state
interests.
This view, or course, is consistent with the perceptions of the Founders, most memorably
stated by Patrick Henry, that a life lived in the absence of freedom is not preferable to
death. Furthermore, the human bondage inflicted by many diseases rivals and often sur-
passes any other kind known to man.
43. In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 349, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985).
44. As Justice Stevens stated in his dissenting opinion in Cruzan: "However com-
mendable may be the State's interest in human life, it cannot pursue that interest by ap-
propriating Nancy Cruzan's life as a symbol for its own purposes." Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2892 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (H. Paton trans. 1949).
The instances in which this proposition is more frequently violated involve pregnant wo-
men. See generally Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered
Caesareans, supra note 5.
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3. Prevention of Suicide
The second state interest is the prevention of suicide. The weight
of authority currently supports the proposition that refusing life-saving
medical treatment, whether it is the amputation of a gangrenous limb
4 6
or the use of a mechanical ventilator,4 7 does not constitute suicide. The
ensuing death is deemed to be the result of the underlying medical con-
dition, not the patient's act of refusing treatment.4 8 The moment we
attempt to qualify the right to consent or refuse to consent to treatment
based upon the purported "wisdom" of the decision or its potentially
lethal consequences (when they are wholly or primarily self-regarding),
the right disappears in a swarm of qualifications and judgmental charac-
terizations. The right to choose should not be limited by the stipulation
that it be a wise choice.49 It simply must be a choice that does not in-
vade the rights of others. Neither physicians, hospitals, nor even imme-
diate family members have rights that are in any way invaded by a
patient's exercise of such a choice. To argue to the contrary, in the case
of the members of the immediate family, for example, would be to assert
that a spouse or minor child could prevent the other adult parent from
engaging in any inherently dangerous activity, such as skydiving, hang-
gliding, or mountain-climbing, on the grounds that he or she created an
unreasonable risk of death or grave injury that could deprive the family
of its "right" to his or her continued existence in the home. We have
never, as a society founded upon the principles of liberty and self-deter-
mination, embraced such a proposition.50
4. Protection of Innocent Third Parties
The third state interest is the protection of innocent third parties.
In treatment refusal cases, the third party is usually a fetus or minor
child of the patient.5 1 As discussed in the next section, it is this author's
46. Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Quacken-
bush, 156 NJ. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 136
Misc. 2d 931, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
47. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Leach
v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); In re Grant, 109
Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987).
48. See generally A. MEISEL, supra note 12, at 66-69 (1989).
49. Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1986).
50. J.S. Mill's statement regarding private decisionmaking is even more compelling in
the refusal of treatment context:
[W]ith respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or
woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be pos-
sessed by anyone else. The interference of society to overrule his judgment and
purposes in what only regards himself, must be grounded on general presump-
tions; which may be altogether wrong and, even if right, are as likely as not to be
misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circum-
stances of such cases than those who look at them merely from without.
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 74 (E. Rapaport 1978).
51. The issues raised by the refusals of pregnant women to consent to procedures
necessary to save the life of their fetuses are sufficiently complex to be beyond the scope of
this article. Therefore, the discussion that follows will be restricted to refusals of treatment
by the parents of minor children. For cogent discussion of the issues with regard to fe-
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view that there are significant constitutional problems inherent in the
contention that being the parent of a minor child, particularly a single or
an indigent parent, somehow circumscribes one's right to give or with-
hold consent to his or her own medical treatment as opposed to that of
the minor child. 52 Beyond the constitutional dimension, however, is
the fact alluded to above that society does not purport to circumscribe
fundamental life choices of adults solely on the grounds that they are
parents. Fathers and mothers of minor children can engage in the full
range of lawful but nevertheless inherently dangerous activities - they
can use tobacco products and consume alcoholic beverages, they can
even separate, divorce, and permanently remove themselves from the
minor child's life, subject only to state laws governing financial support.
Indeed, the state even countenances the ultimate voluntary abandon-
ment, placing the child in an adoptive home. Logically an individual's
right to autonomy, privacy and bodily integrity inherent in the informed
consent doctrine should hold with the same vigor for parents of minor
children as it does for any other competent adult.
5. Medical Ethics
The last of the four interests, maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession, is perhaps the most perplexing of all. Given the
contractual nature of the physician-patient relationship, 58 one might
reasonably ask how abiding by a competent patient's decision whether
or not to consent to a particular procedure could ever compromise the
ethics of the physician. Unfortunately, the courts have given credence to
the proposition that abiding by patient refusals may compromise the
ethics of the profession. 54 Judicial recognition of the merits of such an
argument is tantamount to creating a common law right of physicians to
tuses, see: Nelson, Buggy & Weil, supra note 5; Rhoden, supra note 5; Note, The Creation of
Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection,
95 YALE LJ. 599 (1986).
52. See infra note 208-210 and accompanying text. The legal basis and ethical propri-
ety of precluding parents from withholding necessary medical treatment from their minor
children is well established. See generally Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public Agency to
Order Medical Treatment over Parental Religious Objections for Child Whose Life Is Not Immediately
Endangered, 52 A.L.R.3d 1118 (1973).
53. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
54. The case of United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965), involved
far more than a mere allusion to the interest. In what appears to be a shocking instance of
judicial duplicity, the federal judge who decided the case went to the bedside of a hospital-
ized patient who was refusing on religious grounds a transfusion as part of the treatment
for a bleeding ulcer. After reassuring the patient that the court had no power to force a
transfusion upon him, and that he was free to continue to decline the transfusion, the
judge thereupon signed an order allowing the hospital to administer such transfusions as
the attending physicians deemed necessary to save the patient's life. In the opinion issued
in conjunction with the order, the judge explained his ruling as follows:
In the difficult realm of religious liberty it is often assumed only the religious
conscience is imperiled. Here, however, the doctor's conscience and professional
oath must be respected. In the present case the patient voluntarily submitted
himself to and insisted upon medical care. Simultaneously he sought to dictate to
the treating physicians a course of treatment amounting to medical malpractice.
To require these doctors to ignore the mandates of their own consciences, even
in the name of free religious exercise, cannot be justified under these circum-
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practice paternalistic medicine. This so-called state interest gives new
meaning to the concept of "therapeutic belligerence." 55
Lurking beneath this state interest is an attitude that individuals
who are not prepared to submit fully to the recommendations of physi-
cians or hospitals should stay away from both. In justifying the hospi-
tal's action in bringing the Georgetown College case, Judge Wright says:
"Mrs. Jones sought medical attention and placed on the hospital the
legal responsibility for her proper care. In its dilemma, not of its own
making, the hospital sought judicial direction."' 56 Judge Wright ignores
the fact that part of the hospital's legal responsibility to each patient is to
undertake invasive procedures only when the patient has given a valid
consent.
In the same vein, a commentator has admonished the independent-
minded patients and patients whose religious convictions conflict with
some aspects of accepted medical practice requiring them to stay out of
hospitals. 57 In one final example, the court in Long IslandJewish-Hillside
Medical Center v. Levitt,5 8 states, "The Court takes note that once Mr.
Levitt became a patient at [the hospital], it was the responsibility of the
hospital and doctors to treat him" (impliedly even without his consent).
Such language transcends even the most rigid views of medical paternal-
ism by suggesting that entering a hospital or initiating a physician-pa-
tient relationship is akin to indentured servitude in that the patient is
denied any decisionmaking responsibility. 59 Fortunately, we have ad-
vanced our thinking somewhat since the above examples. The Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
has promulgated a "Patient's Bill of Rights," 60 and the major medical
stances. The patient may knowingly decline treatment, but he may not demand
mistreatment.
Id. at 754. It is hard to imagine a case in which a patient's refusal of medical treatment
necessary to save his life would not come within this court's definition of "mistreatment."
55. E. PELLEGRINO & D. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF
BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE 94 (1988).
56. In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom., Jones v. President of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
57. Sharpe & Hargest, Lifesaving Treatmentfor Unwilling Patients, 36 FORDHAM L. REV.
695, 706 (1968). Interestingly, elsewhere in this article the authors acknowledged that the
standing of physicians and hospitals in treatment refusal cases, either to assert their own
interests or those of the state, is highly questionable in light of the fact that treatment
refusals are the exception and citizens do not have a legal responsibility to submit to medi-
cal care either to please healthcare providers or to maintain themselves for society's bene-
fit. Id. at 698-704.
58. 73 Misc. 395, 396, 342 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
59. At one point the Hippocratic Oath describes the physician-patient relationship as
being between one who orders and one who obeys. "Oath of Hippocrates," in Hip-
PoCRATEs, LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 289 (W. Jones trans. 1972).
60. In order to be accredited, hospitals must adopt a statement of patients' rights that
provides, in pertinent part:
The patient shall not be subjected to any procedure without his voluntary,
competent, and understanding consent or that of his legally authorized
representative....
The patient may refuse treatment to the extent permitted by law. When refusal of
treatment by the patient or his legally authorized representative prevents the pro-
vision of appropriate care in accordance with professional standards, the relation-
ship with the patient may be terminated upon reasonable notice.
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organizations have issued statements that it is not a violation of any ethi-
cal principles of medicine to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ment at the request of the patient or a proper surrogate, or when such
treatment cannot reasonably be expected to benefit the patient.6 l
B. Justiciability and Standing
The vast majority of treatment refusal cases are decided by state
courts. The immediate and significant distinction between state and fed-
eral courts is jurisdiction. Federal courts are characterized as courts of
limited jurisdiction. The practical significance of this characterization is
that a person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must,
as a condition precedent, demonstrate that the case which he is bringing
"is within the competence of such a court."' 62 This requirement is based
upon the presumption that a federal court lacks jurisdiction in a particu-
lar case unless the plaintiff or petitioner has demonstrated that jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of the litigation exists.63 A finding of
subject matter jurisdiction, however, is simply the first step. Questions
of justiciability and standing must also be answered in the plaintiff's
favor before the court may properly proceed with the case. Further-
more, federal subject-matter jurisdiction extends only to "cases" and
"controversies."6 These terms denote two distinct requirements. The
first is that the question at issue in the litigation must be presented in a
genuinely adversarial context as well as in a form which has been histori-
cally accepted "as capable of resolution through the judicial process." 65
The controversy requirement recognizes the tripartite allocation of
power in the federal system, and requires the judiciary to steer clear of
areas committed to the legislative and executive branches of the
government.
66
The next hurdle for the would-be federal litigant is the question of
standing. One who seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction must demon-
strate "personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly un-
lawful conduct likely to be redressed by the requested relief."
'6 7
Although standing is a well established requirement for federal jurisdic-
tion, federal courts sometimes down play its importance. A case in point
is In re President Georgetown College, Inc. 68 In that case, a teaching hospital
sought an order from federal Judge Skelly Wright allowing the treating
JCAHO, Accreditation Manual XIII (1988).
61. See infra note 62.
62. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 15 (2d ed. 1970).
63. Id.
64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
65. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3-7, at 67 (2d ed. 1988).
66. Id.
67. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Professor Tribe, referring to the lan-
guage quoted from this opinion, observes that: "Were the case-or-controversy inquiry fo-
cused on the existence of a concrete dispute and vigorous advocacy, a litigant alleging no
injury to his own 'interests,' whether statutory or otherwise, might nonetheless have stand-
ing." L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 3-15, at I11 n.4 (citation omitted).
68. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
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physician to administer transfusions to an adult patient over her relig-
iously-based objections. In the course of his discussion of the facts and
the applicable legal principles, Judge Wright at no time discussed the
issues of standing and justiciability. Instead, he focused on his personal
view that the refusal of life-sustaining treatment was tantamount to sui-
cide, and that the patient had a responsibility to the community to care
for her infant. Therefore, he concluded, the people had an interest in
preserving the patient's life which presumably was a more compelling
interest than the patient's interests in autonomy, self-determination, and
bodily integrity.
69
The most significant aspect of this case for purposes of this article is
the dissenting opinion written by Justice Burger in the decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit de-
nying rehearing en banc. Justice Burger asserted that courts "have an
obligation to deal with the basic question whether any judicially cogniza-
ble issue is presented when a legally competent adult refuses, on
grounds of conscience, to consent to a medical treatment essential to
preserve life."'70 Since the "touchstone" ofjusticiability is "'injury to a
legally protected right,' [t]he threshold issue... [must be] whether the
hospital had a right which it was entitled to require the court to en-
force." 71 It was undisputed in this case that both the patient and her
husband had offered to provide the hospital with a written release from
liability for any adverse consequences that might flow from honoring the
patient's refusal to authorize the transfusions. Since apparently the only
"injury" the hospital could put forward was a potential lawsuit by some
other party claiming to have suffered an economic loss from the death of
the patient, Justice Burger found the hospital's assertion of economic
damage unsupported.
72
Justice Burger's discussion of the justiciability issue is instructive for
right to refuse treatment cases in state courts as well. Quoting Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
Burger asserts:
Limitation on "the judicial power of the United States" is ex-
pressed by the requirement that the litigant must have "stand-
69. Id. at 1008. In his opinion judge Wright also makes reference to the parens patriae
power of the state. As will be discussed at greater length hereinafter, the judge in this and
virtually every other case assumes that the healthcare providers, even when they are pri-
vate institutions or individuals, can invoke and assert this sovereign power of the state.
This is an assumption that is subject to serious question.
70. 331 F.2d at 1015 (Burger, dissenting).
71. Id (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 841 U.S. 123
(1950)). A review of the right to refuse treatment cases painfully demonstrates that this
question is one which state and federal trial and appellate judges rarely, if ever, bother to
ask in such cases.
72. Id. at 1015-16. Without any regard to procedural or jurisdictional niceties, the
courts in such cases allow the plaintiff healthcare provider, without legitimate portfolio, to
don the cloak of the state and assert its supposed interests. In criticizing this phenome-
non, I am, of course, excluding those cases which are properly decided in the procedural
posture of a guardianship hearing which seeks to demonstrate that the patient, because of
decisional incapacity, is an appropriate subject of the state's parens patriae power.
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ing to sue" or, more comprehensively, that a federal court may
entertain a controversy only if it is "justiciable." Both charac-
terizations mean that a court will not decide a question unless
the nature of the action challenged, the kind of injury inflicted,
and the relationship between the parties are such that judicial
determination is consonant with what was, generally speaking,
the business of the Colonial courts and the courts of Westmin-
ster when the Constitution was framed.
73
Justice Burger goes on to interpret the above language as addressing
more than merely the well-established concept of limited federal juris-
diction as compared with broader state court jurisdiction since the Colo-
nial courts and the Courts of Westminster of the 1780's were courts of
general jurisdiction. Frankfurter's point, according to Burger, is that
there are matters of "strictly private concern" that do not fit properly
within the legitimate authority of any of the three branches of govern-
ment. Addressing the appropriateness of any federal or state court tak-
ing jurisdiction over cases brought by healthcare providers when
presumably competent patients refuse life-sustaining procedures, he
opines:
[W]e must inquire where an assumption of jurisdiction over
such matters could lead us. Physicians, surgeons and hospitals
and others as well are often confronted with seemingly irrecon-
cilable demands and conflicting pressures. Philosophers and
theologians have pondered these problems and different reli-
gious groups have evolved different solutions; the solutions
and doctrines of one group are sometimes not acceptable to
other groups or sects.... May the physician or hospital require
the courts to decide? A patient may be in a critical condition
requiring, in the minds of experts, certain medical or surgical
procedure. If the patient has objections to that treatment...
are the courts empowered to decide for him?
Some of our greatest jurists have emphasized the need for
judicial awareness of the limits on judicial power which is sim-
ply an acknowledgement of human fallibility.
[W]e should... reconcile ourselves to the idea that there are
myriads of problems and troubles which judges are powerless
to solve; and this is as it should be. Some matters of essentially
private concern and others of enormous public concern, are
beyond the reach of judges. 74
In 1964 Justice Burger was a voice crying in the wilderness. To a
disturbingly significant degree, few judges at any level have expressed
similar concerns about the encroachment of government and the courts
into matters of private decisionmaking.7 5 Perhaps, like Judge Skelly
73. 331 F.2d 1000, 1016 (1964) (Burger J., dissenting) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1950)).
74. In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1017-18 (D.C.
Cir.)(footnote omitted), cert. denied sub norm., Jones v. President of Georgetown College,
Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
75. Treatment refusal cases are replete with judicial references to the "unacceptable"
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Wright, they are unable or unwilling to maintain their judicial demeanor
and detachment when the healthcare provider's lawyer calls and says:
"We need an order for treatment stat!"' 76 Judge Markowitz of New
York, one of the few state court judges to have demonstrated sensitivity
to issues of jurisdiction, standing, and justiciability, nevertheless suc-
cumbed to the pressures of a life or death situation in at least one of
several such cases that came before him during his years on the bench.
His anxiety is evident in the reported opinion:
Never before had my judicial robe weighed so heavily on my
shoulders. Years of legal training, experience and responsibil-
ity had added a new dimension to my mental processes - I,
almost by reflex action, subjected the papers to the test ofjus-
ticiability, jurisdiction and legality. I read Application of President
and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc. and was convinced of the
proper course from a legal standpoint. Yet, ultimately, my de-
cision to act to save this woman's life was rooted in more funda-
mental precepts.
7 7
UnlikeJudge Markowitz, most state court judges do not make a dis-
tinction between general and unlimited jurisdiction. If left unchal-
position in which patients place health care providers when they seek medical assistance
but then proceed to pick and choose the types of treatment they accept and those they
reject. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
76. Consider, for example, the following case of a 72 year old female who was hospi-
talized for pneumonia. A week after admission she was found to have gangrene in both
legs and was told she would need to undergo bilateral, below-the-knee amputations in
order to have more than an estimated 10% chance of survival. The patient refused to
consent to the amputations, whereupon a psychiatric consult was immediately sought, re-
quiring the consulting psychiatrist to drive through a snowstorm to the hospital to ex-
amine the patient and give an immediate opinion. In all likelihood, the surgeons would
have performed the amputations without such a consult and based only on the patient's
consent, if the patient had in fact consented. But because she refused her consent, a psy-
chiatric consult was ordered. The psychiatrist concluded, solely on the basis of the pa-
tient's refusal of consent despite the bleak prognosis, that her refusal was persuasive
evidence of her incapacity to give an informed consent or refusal. The very next day the
state department of human services, having been brought into the matter by the hospital,
sought custody of the patient and authority to consent to the surgery. The trial court
judge, who granted the custody petition which resulted in the patient's legs being ampu-
tated, acknowledged later that he had allowed himself to be misled by the way in which the
case was presented. He was given the impression that the surgeon was waiting with scalpel
in hand by the telephone. The consulting psychiatrist, when subsequently queried, simi-
larly acknowledged that he had not adequately examined the patient when he reached his
conclusion, but that was because he was in a time crunch because of the purported life-
threatening situation. Abernathy, Compassion, Control, and Decisions About Competency, in
BioETcs: READINGS AND CASES 60 (B. Brody & H. Engelhardt 1987).
77. Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 216, 267
N.Y.S.2d 450, 451 (1965). This case, like Georgetown College, involved a Jehovah's Witness
patient who would not consent to a transfusion but who did not necessarily regard one
administered over her objection as placing her in a religious quandary.
Judge Markowitz also decided a case in which an elderly female patient who clearly
was incapacitated refused to consent to an amputation. In denying the guardianship peti-
tion, he observed that there was "serious doubt here as to the existence of a truly justicia-
ble legal controversy, despite the claimed vital factor of a human life hanging in the
balance." In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 621, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624, 628 (1966). He went on
to state, in the same vein asJustice Burger in Georgetown College: "Confronted by a situation
such as this, I am of the opinion that the time has come for courts to inquire where a
continued condonation of such action and where a continued assumption of jurisdiction
over such matters lead." Id. at 623, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
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lenged by the defendants in refusal-of-treatment cases, judges operate
on the presumption that they have jurisdiction over such controver-
sies.78 The question remains nevertheless, at least in those cases in
which the patient-defendant is represented by competent counsel, why
issues ofjurisdiction and standing are not raised. Even in cases of bed-
side hearings by the judge, those issues can and should be raised,
thereby preserving them for appeal if the court refuses to consider them
at the time. The absence of jurisdictional discussion in the growing
body of appellate decisions is perplexing and troubling. Mootness can-
not be the answer. Appellate courts often refuse to dismiss the appeal
on the grounds of mootness in order to assure that important issues
which are likely to recur are ultimately resolved. 7 9
C. Elements of a Cause of Action
The case or controversy doctrine is based upon the principle that
courts exist (federal and state) for the determination of actual and pres-
ently existing controversies, and not, except under special and limited
provisions for declaratory judgments, to provide a basis for judicial
opinions upon discrete points of law. It is, therefore, axiomatic that un-
less a claim presented to a court contains all of the requisite elements of
a cause of action, it must fail and should be dismissed. An examination
of the essential elements of a valid cause of action clearly demonstrates
the fatal flaws in most refusal-of-treatment lawsuits.
The first element is the existence of a "primary legal right" with
which the law has invested the plaintiff and for which the law provides a
remedy against the party infringing that right.80 Thus, in the case of a
competent patient refusing to submit to an invasive procedure by a phy-
sician, the law must invest the physician with a legal right to perform the
procedure with or without the patient's consent. The law of informed
consent provides exactly the opposite. Without valid consent, actual or
presumed, the physician has no right to perform such a procedure, and
in fact can be held liable to the patient on a theory of battery or medical
malpractice.
Since the first element of a cause of action is absent, the physician's
petition should be dismissed because it is defective. If the physician has
no legal right to treat a patient without his consent, then clearly the sec-
ond element, violation of a right or duty owed to the plaintiff by the
defendant, is absent as well. Patients, once they engage in the contrac-
tual physician-patient relationship, have no duty to submit to any treat-
ment recommended by the physician. As set out in the previous section,
the relationship must be constantly reaffirmed at every stage, and the
patient must be the final arbiter.8 1 If the physician considers himself
78. C. Wright, supra note 62.
79. See, e.g., Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 221 n.1, 551 N.E.2d 77, 78 n.1, 551
N.Y.S.2d 876, 887 n.l (Ct. App. 1990).
80. Granahan v. Celanese Corp., 3 NJ. 187, 191, 69 A.2d 572, 574 (1949).
81. See supra note 17.
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ethically compromised by the patient's refusal, his only legitimate re-
course is to withdraw from the relationship. By filing an action in pur-
suit of a court order compelling the patient to submit to the physician's
recommended treatment, the physician seeks specific performance of a
purported contractual obligation of the patient to accept treatment. No
such contractual obligation exists.
Finally, it is a well-established principle that the proper exercise of a
legal right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie,
even if the other party can demonstrate an adverse consequence.
Therefore, since the patient has the right to refuse medical treatment,
the exercise of that right cannot be actionable on the part of the physi-
cian even if he can demonstrate some damage, such as compromising his
perception of medical ethics or creating a fear that ultimately the non-
treatment may be the subject of a malpractice claim. Such damage is to
be considered damnum absque injuria. ("Damage without wrong.")
8 2
D. Procedural Challenges to Actions Seeking to Force Treatment
The rules of civil procedure in effect in every jurisdiction, and par-
ticularly Federal Rule 12(b), provide a theoretically effective means to
challenge efforts to force treatment on unwilling, competent patients.
8 3
Rule 12(b) (1), for example, authorizes the filing of a motion to dismiss a
petition or complaint on the grounds that the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. Similarly, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) asserts that the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Once
filed, the court must rule on the motion before proceeding further with
the case.8 4 In the context of such motions a patient can properly assert
that his refusal of treatment does not constitute a civil wrong to the hos-
pital or his treating physician, or a breach of contract. To the contrary,
the bringing of such an action is an attempt by the healthcare provider
to extend the contractual relationship beyond the limits of mutual con-
sent in violation of the fundamental principles which govern the physi-
82. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. State Highway Comm'n, 268 N.C. 92, 96, 150 S.E.2d
70, 73 (1966).
83. Similar rules exist in most, if not all, states. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) states in perti-
nent part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack ofjurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insuffi-
ciency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19.... If,
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
84. See, e.g., 4 R. HARDAWAY & S. HYA-r, COLORADO PRACTI1CE 108 (2d ed. 1985). Even
if the patient does not make a formal motion, the court may sua sponte (on its own motion)
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.
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cian-patient relationship and the doctrine of informed consent. 85
When the issue is whether the physician has a legitimate cause of
action against the patient, a motion for summary judgment is a more
expeditious and effective method to achieve the prompt termination of
an action that lacks substantive merit. Usually there are no disputed is-
sues of material fact in these cases unless the patient's competence has
been called into question. Therefore, the facts alleged in the healthcare
provider's petition, as opposed to conclusory allegations that do not
necessarily follow from the facts, will be assumed to be true, and the
ultimate question of law decided.
86
In the typical case, the healthcare provider initiating the action does
not assert interests of a private or personal nature. Were that the case, it
is very difficult to imagine how the petition could survive a Rule 12(b)
motion. Rather, the healthcare provider attempts, in most cases suc-
cessfully, to characterize its role as spokesperson of or surrogate for so-
ciety and/or the state. No reported cases have been found in which the
patient-defendant, or the court on its own motion, has challenged the
standing of a healthcare provider to assert the interests of the state in
the litigation without any special designation or without the formal in-
tervention of a party for the expressed purpose of representing the
state.8 7 Since this issue never seems to be raised and discussed in the
cases, one can only speculate how this procedural sleight of hand is ac-
complished. Perhaps the state court judge presumes to "look after"
these purported state interests.8 8 As a matter of impartiality and judicial
ethics, however, one might well ask how the patient is to receive a fair
hearing if both the plaintiff healthcare provider and the judge are mak-
ing certain that the interests of the state are respected. Despite the ef-
forts of healthcare providers and judges to assert the contrary, these are
adversarial proceedings-one party seeks to compel the other party's
submission to an invasive medical procedure with inherent risks. In re-
85. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
86. FED. R. Civ. PRo. 56(b) provides: "A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any
part thereof."
87. Several cases, however, involve the states as a party because the trial court
brought the attorney general into the litigation on its own motion. See infra note 99.
88. One argument that has not been explicitly put forward but must be considered as
to how a court from a procedural standpoint can apply the interests of a non-party (the
state) so as to overcome the interests of an actual party (the patient) is that the state inter-
ests are in the nature of public policy. Courts routinely invoke such principles in litigation
between private parties in ways which affect the outcome of the case at bar without ever
making a representative of the public a party to the action. For example, conduct or con-
tracts of an illegal or immoral nature cannot be a proper basis forjudicial relief at law or in
equity. In response to this rationale for application of the state interests in treatment
refusal cases, I would suggest three flaws: first, this justification has never been expressly
offered by the courts; second, the "void as against public policy" principle has always been
applied as an absolute bar to the action, never as a countervailing consideration; and third,
the right to refuse treatment as a general principle has too much support in the case law
and the legal and ethical literature to simply be dismissed as against public policy.
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gard to these purported state interests, the protection of its citizen's
rights to autonomy and bodily integrity is rarely asserted.
If, as a matter of fact and law, it is the state's interests and not those
of the healthcare providers that are actually counterpoised to the pa-
tient's well-established right to refuse treatment, then the court should
not proceed further without the state becoming a party to the suit. Rule
12(b)(7) provides as a basis for a motion to dismiss situations in which a
necessary party as defined by Rule 19 has not been joined. For such a
motion to be granted, the court must determine that disposition of the
action in that party's absence might prejudice the missing party or the
parties already before the court. Now that the United States Supreme
Court has recognized both the patient's constitutional right to refuse
treatment and the state's (not the healthcare provider's) right to assert
its countervailing interests,8 9 the patient should insist that the state
come forward and affirmatively demonstrate in court what its interests
are in the matter and why they should prevail. Without the state's par-
ticipation as an actual party, the patient is prejudiced by the speculative
nature in which these state interests are introduced. Although a civil
matter, there is a sense in which the patient has the same need to con-
front his "accuser" (who would override his constitutional and common
law right to privacy and bodily integrity) as a defendant in a criminal
case.
90
89. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2041 (1990). This case is the
first so-called "right-to-die" case that the Supreme Court has considered. Briefly, the case
involves an adult female patient, Nancy Cruzan, who has been in a chronic vegetative state
since an automobile accident in 1983. She receives nutrition and hydration through a
gastrostomy tube surgically implanted in her stomach. Based upon her physician's opin-
ion that she will not return to a cognitive, sapient state, and her own statements while
competent that she would not want to be maintained in a vegetative condition, her parents
requested that the gastrostomy tube be removed. When the nursing home in which she
resides refused, the parents initiated legal proceedings. The hearing judge ruled, consis-
tent with the position of the guardian ad litem appointed to represent Nancy Cruzan, that
her parents, as co-guardians of her person, were acting in her best interests and consistent
with her previously expressed wishes when they requested removal of the gastronomy
tube. Therefore, the respondents were ordered to follow their instructions. On appeal, a
divided Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the absence of clear and con-
vincing evidence that Nancy Cruzan would have refused artificial nutrition and hydration,
her parents were without authority to order it.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that
although competent patients have a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment aris-
ing out of the liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment, the state may prop-
erly assert its countervailing interests and may constitutionally require, in the case of
incompetent patients, clear and convincing evidence of the patient's views before allowing
a surrogate to order the removal of life-sustaining treatment.
90. The decision in Cruzan suggests, in a brief and somewhat cryptic reference, that
the "guarantee of accurate factfinding that the adversary process brings with it" is not a
requirement imposed by the Constitution upon states in proceedings involving the termi-
nation of life-sustaining medical treatment for an incompetent patient. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct.
at 2853. This view, however, presumes that such proceedings could never result in a le-
gally cognizable injury to the patient, a point which the dissenting justices and many other
thoughtful persons would contest. Arguably, an incompetent patient such as Nancy
Cruzan, who is maintained on life-support when her conscious and competent choice
would have been to the contrary, is seriously injured by governmental action, and hence is
entitled not merely to the rigors and formalities of an adversarial proceeding, but also to
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In cases where the trial court refuses to consider and rule upon a
Rule 12(b) motion, and instead wrongfully assumes jurisdiction order-
ing treatment over a competent adult's objection, most states provide an
avenue for speedy relief directly from the state supreme court before the
trial court order is carried out. For example, Colorado Rule of Civil
Procedure 106(4) provides that in a case in which it is alleged that an
inferior state tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction, and there is no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy at law, the Colorado Supreme Court may
direct that tribunal to show cause why it should not be prohibited from
proceeding further.9 1 The supreme court review is solely to determine
whether jurisdiction has been exceeded or abused. 92 The review is by
no means a cursory one in which the lower court's exercise ofjurisdic-
tion is rubber-stamped or automatically assumed proper. In this regard,
the Colorado Supreme Court has stated:
"[n]o question of greater 'public importance' can arise than
one in which a court is proceeding without jurisdiction of the
person or subject matter." In the interest of justice, we con-
sider it as much our duty, when our superintending control of
inferior tribunals is invoked, to keep such tribunals within their
jurisdiction, as it is to correct errors of such tribunals exercis-
ing proper jurisdiction.
93
Clearly such a challenge to the exercise of jurisdiction by a trial
court in our hypothetical case would be appropriate. There is no allega-
tion that the patient lacks capacity to make an informed decision; there-
fore, the court cannot base its assumption of jurisdiction upon a
guardianship proceeding for an incompetent adult. Neither can the
plaintiff physician demonstrate any common law claim, contractual right,
or tortious wrong suffered because his recommendations were not
followed.
9 4
E. Applying the State Interests
Returning to the hypothetical case, perhaps the only one of the four
state interests that cannot be applied is the last, and only because our
the due process protection of the sixth amendment. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467
F.2d 755, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
91. This review is discretionary, and one would, of course, need to seek a stay of the
trial court's ruling pending any Rule 106 disposition by the supreme court.
92. Kellner v. District Court, 127 Colo. 320, 324, 256 P.2d 887, 889 (1953).
93. Id. at 324, 256 P.2d at 889 (quoting Carlson v. District Court, 116 Colo. 330, 343,
180 P.2d 525, 532 (1947)).
94. Relying for support on language in cases such as Bartling v. Superior Court, 163
Cal. App. 3d 186, 197, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (1984) and In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
382, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981), one article states unequivocally:
[N]o statute, regulation, or judicial decision places an affirmative duty on physi-
cians ... to seek a court order that would override the wishes of any competent
adult patient, including a pregnant woman.... There is no reported case impos-
ing civil damages or criminal penalties on any physician for failing to seek judicial
review of a competent adult's refusal of treatment. In fact, courts have flatly re-
jected the notion that a physician could be held civilly or criminally liable for
honoring the competent adult's refusal of medical treatment.
Nelson, Buggy & Weil, supra note 5, at 724-25.
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patient is neither hospitalized nor seeking alternative treatment from the
physician. The state can claim an interest in his continued life, which is
a realistic possibility (beyond 18 months) only if he undergoes chemo-
therapy. If chemotherapy in his case would be life-saving, then those
with Judge Skelly Wright's viewpoint can call his refusal an act of sui-
cide.9 5 The most compelling of the three state interests as applied to
the situation of our hypothetical patient is that his acceptance of death
by cancer can be characterized as a form of abandonment of his econom-
ically-dependent wife and minor children, which might ultimately create
a financial drain on the state treasury. Proponents of the viability and
propriety of these state interests would find in this hypothetical a com-
pelling case for a court order subjecting our patient to treatment against
his will.
The aspect of the hypothetical that might cause a court to hesitate,
even if presided over by a state interests advocate, is that the patient is
not in the hospital or, as yet, in a seriously debilitated condition. Conse-
quently, if the order for treatment were issued but the patient refused to
comply with it, there would likely be only two practical alternatives open
to the judge, both of them highly repugnant to the citizens of a demo-
cratic society. The first alternative would be to hold the patient in con-
tempt of court for failing to submit to treatment. Like journalists who
have been ordered but refuse to divulge confidential sources, he would
be placed in jail until he purged himself of contempt or obtained his
release on bond pending appellate review of the trial court's order. 96
The second option would be for the court, pursuant to the order, to
have the patient taken from his home by the police, hospitalized in a
locked unit, and perhaps even placed in four-point restraints for pur-
poses of the actual administration of chemotherapy. Such "shock the
conscience" behavior by a court of law would reach far beyond what the
United States Supreme Court has upheld with regard to forced bodily
examination or treatment of criminal suspects, 9 7 thus most courts would
probably be convinced, in light of the logistical difficulties posed by the
hypothetical, that the four interests of the individual-in autonomy, self-
determination, privacy, and bodily integrity-are more compelling in
this case.98 The point, however, is that continued recognition of these
95. In his concurring opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, Justice
Scalia joins the decimated ranks of those who still consider the refusal of life-sustaining
medical treatment to be suicide. 110 S. Ct. 2041 at 2059-62 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
96. This would hardly fulfill the patient's expressed desires to spend his remaining
days in quality time with his family.
97. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (disallowing law enforcement efforts
to force surgery on a suspect to remove a bullet); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952) (holding a forcible stomach pump to obtain swallowed narcotics to be
unconstitutional).
98. Professor Meisel makes the point that the proclivity of the courts in treatment
refusal cases to assert the state interests in an adversarial fashion against the liberty inter-
ests of the individual "erroneously" suggests that the state has no concern for the auton-
omy, self-determination, privacy, and bodily integrity of its citizens. However, he cites
only one case in which the state demonstrated any concern for those individual interests.
In that case, Mercy Hosp. v.Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985), vacated 306
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state interests in the case of a competent patient, and the willingness of
courts to overlook genuine issues of justiciability and proper parties,
means that every patient is at risk of having his or her refusal to consent
to recommended treatment subjected to judicial review. Furthermore,
the patient has virtually no recourse against the healthcare provider for
this fundamental violation of privacy expectations.9 9 The time has
come, therefore, as the Supreme Court recognized in Cruzan, to ac-
knowledge the constitutional stature of the right to refuse treatment.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT
The constitutional dimension of the right to refuse treatment was
recognized by the NewJersey Supreme Court in In re Quinlan. 00 Since
then, commentators have noted a trend by state courts away from a con-
stitutional basis for recognizing the right to refuse treatment and toward
primary, if not exclusive, reliance upon the common law. 0 1 In particu-
Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562 (1986), the state, in an amicus brief, opposed the hospital's effort
to override a competent patient's refusal of a potentially life-saving transfusion on the
grounds that in such a case fundamental individual liberty overrode the state interest in
preservinj life. A. MEISEL, supra note 12, at 96-97.
In a case decided subsequent to Professor Meisel's book, Georgia v. McAfee, 259 Ga.
579, 385 S.E.2d 651 (1989), a similar conclusion was reached. That case involved a motor-
cycle accident victim whose spinal cord injury rendered him a quadriplegic and incapable
of spontaneous respiration. When, after four years of ventilator dependency, he requested
that the respirator be turned off, the public hospital and attending physician declined to
follow his request. The patient filed an action in the state trial court seeking an order that
the respirator be turned off and that he be provided with appropriate medication to allevi-
ate the pain that he would thereafter experience.
The trial judge brought the Georgia Attorney General into the case to represent the
interests of the state; however, the Attorney General took the position that although the
state did not advocate or approve of the course of action the patient sought to pursue,
there was no basis on the facts of the case upon which the state could legitimately inter-
vene and oppose the patient's exercise of his right to refuse treatment. The patient pre-
vailed at the trial court level, as well as in the state supreme court, where an appeal was
taken by the Attorney General at the direction of the trial court because the case was one
of first impression in Georgia.
99. See Miller, Right-to-Die Damage Actions: Deveopments in the Law, 65 DEN. U.L. REv.
181 (1988) for a review of the dismal prospects for patients in such countersuits.
Although far short of a trend, two recent decisions as reported in 18 HEALTH L. DIG. 6
(1990) offer a glimmer of hope that the trend may be reversing. In Malette v. Shulman
(1990, 72 O.R. (2d) 417; [1990] OJ. No. 450; Doc. No. CA 29/88 (Ont. C.A.), a trial court
award of $20,000 was upheld in favor of a patient in an action in which she alleged that the
treating physician disregarded a card stating that she was a Jehovah's Witness and, as a
matter of religious belief, rejected blood transfusions under any circumstance. The plain-
tiff was unconscious at the time the transfusions were administered. In the second case,
Lunsford v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 837936, Cal. Sup. Ct., Co. of San Francisco
(April 13, 1990), the parents recovered $500,000 in a special verdict against the medical
center and surgeons for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs
were Jehovah's Witness parents of a child with kidney disease. In authorizing a kidney
transplant, they specified that transfusions were not to be used. When that was reported
to be unacceptable to the transplant team, the parents made arrangements for transfer of
their child to a hospital in Houston where the procedure would be performed without
transfusions. Thereupon, the parents were advised that the team in San Francisco would
perform the transplant without transfusions when in fact arrangements were being made
for court-ordered transfusions.
100. In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 38, 355 A.2d 647, 668, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
101. See L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 15-11, at 1365.
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lar, it is noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy 102
expressly stated that it was relying exclusively on common law princi-
ples. 10 3 Although it may be sound judicial policy, particularly on the
part of a state court, to rely on a common law right of citizens in an area
in which the United States Supreme Court has not yet spoken, such reli-
ance should not be viewed as a denigration or denial of a constitutional
basis for the same right.
In this section I will first discuss the United States Supreme Court
decision in the Cruzan case. I will then propose that basing the right to
refuse treatment on constitutional privacy grounds provides a more ra-
tional and effective means of preserving and protecting the interests of
the individual from unwarranted intrusion by the state. I will discuss the
sources for such a constitutional right, and, in doing so, I will take issue
with recent commentators who argue that constitutional arguments are
superfluous in right-to-die cases. Finally, I will distinguish, on constitu-
tional principles, between privacy and autonomy, and suggest that the
former, construed in the context of the historic nature of the physician-
patient relationship, is a proper basis for a presumed family guardian-
ship that would drastically limit the role of the state in private healthcare
decisionmaking.
A. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
The United States Supreme Court has just handed down its deci-
sion in the Cruzan case. 10 4 While it presumes that competent patients
have a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, including nutri-
tion and hydration, based upon the liberty interest of the fourteenth
amendment, it holds that Missouri law does not unconstitutionally en-
cumber that right by requiring that the surrogate decisionmaker for an
incompetent patient present clear and convincing evidence that the pa-
tient would have refused nutrition and hydration under the current cir-
cumstances. As noted by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the opinion of the
Court, "determining that a person has a 'liberty interest' under the Due
Process Clause does not end the inquiry; 'whether respondent's consti-
tutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his
liberty interests against the relevant state interests.' 105 Regrettably,
the Court saw no need to analyze these interests, not even the interest
relied upon by Missouri in Cruzan-preserving life.
102. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
103. Finally, in Quinlan. ... we indicated that the right of privacy enunciated by the
Supreme Court "is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline
medical treatment under certain circumstances" even if that decision might lead
to the patient's death. While this right of privacy might apply in a case such as
this, we need not decide that issue since the right to decline medical treatment is,
in any event, embraced within the common-law right to self-determination.
Id. at 1223 (quoting In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976)) (citations
omitted).
104. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, I10 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). See supra note
89 for the factual and procedural background of the case.
105. Id. at 2851 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
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There are several aspects of the Cruzan case which are particularly
relevant to issues raised in this article. The first is the particular source
in the Constitution for a right to refuse medical treatment. Later in this
section I will discuss in some detail the importance of recognizing a
Constitutional zone of privacy within which medical decisionmaking oc-
curs. It is interesting to note that although the opinion of the Court
bases the right to refuse treatment on the liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment, discussion of the
basis for to such a right for medical decisions is oblique and equivocal at
best. The Court's only reference to privacy is the following language in
a footnote: "Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse
treatment is encompassed by a generalized right of privacy, we have
never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest."
1 0 6
In the same footnote, the Court cites language from Bowers v. Hard-
wick 107 which is critical of creating nontextual constitutional rights. It is
clear that the Court is not comfortable in declaring that constitutional
privacy does not encompass medical decisionmaking; however, by rely-
ing on the liberty interest, which equates with autonomy, the Court runs
headlong into the problems posed by the incompetent patient. The
Court notes that:
Petitioners go on to assert that an incompetent person should
possess the same right in this respect as is possessed by a com-
petent person.
The difficulty with petitioners' claim is that in a sense it begs
the question: an incompetent person is not able to make an in-
formed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to
refuse treatment or any other right. Such a "right" must be
exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate.' 0 8
Later in this section I will argue in favor of a constitutional right to re-
fuse treatment based on privacy as opposed to a right based on liberty
or autonomy, which not only avoids the question-begging criticism, but
also comports with the historical context of medical decisionmaking as
well as the overwhelming consensus of the American people. 10 9
Perhaps the most important language in the opinions written by the
various justices in the Cruzan case is that of Justice O'Connor's concur-
ring opinion in which she discusses the holding of the Court:
[T]he Court does not today decide the issue whether a State
must also give effect to the decisions of a surrogate deci-
sionmaker. In my view, such a duty may well be constitutionally
required to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing
medical treatment. Few individuals provide explicit oral or
written instructions regarding their intent to refuse medical
106. Id. at 2851 n.7 (emphasis added).
107. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).
108. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
109. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
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treatment should they become incompetent. States which de-
cline to consider any evidence other than such instructions may
frequently fail to honor a patient's intent.
Today's decision, holding only that the Constitution permits a
State to require clear and convincing evidence of Nancy
Cruzan's desire to have artificial hydration and nutrition with-
drawn, does not preclude a future determination that the Con-
stitution requires the States to implement the decisions of a
patient's duly appointed surrogate.' 10
SinceJustice O'Connor is clearly a swing vote on the issues raised by the
Cruzan case, states seeking to legislate in the area of treatment refusals
by surrogates must carefully consider what would constitute clear and
convincing evidence of the patient's intent. This will not be any easy
task. Missouri's clear and convincing evidence standard, which
O'Connor approves, "decline[s] to consider any evidence other than
[explicit oral or written] instructions." 1 I Since Justice O'Connor is
clearly concerned about the fact that few individuals provide such ex-
plicit directives as living wills, or duly appoint surrogates through dura-
ble powers of attorney for medical care, it is not readily apparent how
she believes states can simultaneously uphold the sanctity of human life
regardless of its quality and simultaneously safeguard the liberty interest
of the typical incompetent patient who has not left clear and convincing
evidence that he would decline life-sustaining treatment in his current
compromised condition.
If Nancy Cruzan had left a living will that rejected nutrition and
hydration should she be diagnosed as being in a chronic vegetative state,
Justice O'Connor's concurrence suggests that she would join the four
dissenting justices in holding that Missouri's refusal to give effect to
such provisions in its living will statute violates the liberty interests of
patients. 12 Whether ChiefJustice Rehnquist orJustices White or Ken-
nedy would join in such a decision would depend upon how they bal-
anced the state's interest in preserving the life of a patient in a chronic
vegetative state against the patient's right to refuse treatment. One of
the key issues left unresolved by the Cruzan case is the methodology for
balancing the conflicting interests of the patient and the state. In the
case of a patient who has left a living will, who has no dependents,
whose physicians agree that there is no likelihood of ever returning to a
cognitive, sapient state, and whose next of kin strongly urge the with-
drawal of nutrition and hydration, it is difficult to imagine what state
interests could prevail over the expressed wishes of the patient." 3
110. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2057-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. Id.
112. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
113. The Missouri Supreme Court gave a very strong indication as to how it would
balance Nancy Cruzan's right to refuse nutrition and hydration against the state's interest
in preserving life:
Given the fact that Nancy is alive and that the burdens of her treatment are not
excessive for her, we do not believe her right to refuse treatment, whether that
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The most disturbing aspect of the Cruzan decision is the total disre-
gard of the patient as a person. The Court's ruling in Cruzan allows Mis-
souri to totally disregard the best interests of an incompetent patient in
situations in which there is an absence of clear and convincing evidence
that life-sustaining treatment would have been refused. It is this abject
refusal to consider what is in Nancy Cruzan's best interests as a human
being that clearly demonstrates what interest Missouri deems para-
mount. That interest is not the protection of innocent, incompetent pa-
tients from abuse or neglect at the hands of ignorant or malevolent
surrogates, but rather an abstract, dogmatic, quasi-religious principle of
the sanctity of life. The failure of the Missouri appellate courts to ad-
dress the best interests of Nancy Cruzan with an objective test
1 1 4
prompted Justice Stevens to conclude that the heart of Missouri's policy
is an effort to define life. He states, in that regard:
Missouri insists, without regard to Nancy Cruzan's own inter-
ests, upon equating her life with the biological persistence of
her bodily functions.
The State's unflagging determination to perpetuate Nancy
Cruzan's physical existence is comprehensible only as an effort
to define life's meaning, not as an attempt to preserve its
sanctity.
The failure of Missouri's policy to heed the interests of a dying
individual with respect to matters so private is ample evidence
of the policy's illegitimacy.
Only because Missouri has arrogated to itself the power to
define life, and only because the Court permits this usurpation,
are Nancy Cruzan's life and liberty put into disquieting conflict.
If Nancy Cruzan's life were defined by reference to her own
interests, . . . then her constitutionally protected interest in
freedom from unwanted treatment would not come into con-
flict with her constitutionally protected interest in life.1 15
Much more can and certainly will be written about the strengths,
weaknesses and implications of the Cruzan decision. For purposes of this
article, however, the most compelling aspect of that case is that the
right proceeds from a constitutional right of privacy or a common law right to
refuse treatment, outweighs the immense, clear fact of life in which the state
maintains a vital interest.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,424 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 110 S.CT. 2841 (1990).
114. Contra In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 365-68, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232-33 (1985) (discuss-
ing several best-interest tests).
115. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2886-89 (StevensJ., dissenting). Such a mandate to preserve
life even at the expense of the person who must live it is religious in origin and nature.
Such was the basis upon which Paul Ramsey, infra note 124, argued that the individual
person holds his life in trust as a gift from God and therefore may not decline any medical
treatment necessary to maintain the gift. Only when this notion is openly acknowledged to
be religious, however, can the additional protection of the first amendment be marshaled
in support of patients who resist being held hostage to the state's concept of physicians as
the acolytes of a supreme being who declines to grant individuals dominion over their own
bodies. See also K. Clouser, Sanctity of Life, in MEDICAL ETHIcs 71 (M. Abrams & M. Buch-
ner eds. 1983).
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states are free, but at the present time not required, to rely heavily upon
the family as surrogate decisionmaker. In this regard the Court stated:
"If the State were required by the United States Constitution to repose a
right of 'substituted judgment' with anyone, the Cruzans would surely
qualify. But we do not think the Due Process Clause requires the State
to repose judgment on these matters with anyone but the patient
herself." 1
16
B. Refusal of Treatment Based on a Constitutional Right to Privacy
As discussed in section III above, once a healthcare provider de-
clines to accept a refusal of treatment decision by a patient or his surro-
gate, the state government, primarily through the courts, becomes
heavily involved in the decisionmaking process. The outcome, even in
cases that are virtually indistinguishable on their facts, will vary from
court to court and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 117 If, as many liti-
gants, judges, legal commentators, and bioethicists have argued, the
right to refuse treatment is fundamental, then that right should not vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction."18 Let us examine the case for the
existence of a fundamental constitutional right to refuse treatment
based upon the right to privacy.
Thomas Jefferson observed that "It]he legitimate powers of govern-
ment extend to such acts only as are injurious to others." ' 1 9 This state-
ment expresses the fundamental libertarian principle extant among the
Founders and those whom they represented that governments are insti-
tuted among free men for the purpose of securing the rights of the peo-
ple, not to create such rights or infringe upon them when their exercise
is in the form of wholly self-regarding conduct. 120 Behind this principle
of democratic government is the basic concept that the individual, not
the state, ought to be the supreme judge of his own best interests. This
is an essential aspect of self-determination.' 2 1 The "moral fact" that a
person belongs to himself and not to the state is undermined by a rou-
tine balancing of state interests in an effort to determine whether a pa-
tient's refusal of consent to medical treatment should be upheld.
122
116. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.
117. For example, in many jurisdictions courts have upheld the request of a close fam-
ily member that life sustaining measures, including respirators and naso-gastric tubes, be
withdrawn from patients in an irreversible coma. Nevertheless, in Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct.
2841 (1990) and In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d
607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1989) such requests were denied by the highest courts of the
respective states.
118. Cf L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 15-10, at 1358 (discussingjurisdictional variations in
treatment of fundamental rights as concerns abortion).
119. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, quoted in D. RICHARDS, TOLEAtION
AND THE CoNsTrrnTloN 246 (1986).
120. L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMER'S CoNsTrrrrnON 283 (1988).
121. "Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determina-
tion. It follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, ifhe
be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery ..... Natan-
son v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 404, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960).
122. "Mhe concept of privacy embodies the moralfact that a person belongs to himself
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These purported state interests, particularly that of maintaining the
sanctity of life, strongly suggest the notion that the state is asserting a
proprietary interest in the lives and bodies of its citizens. Such a notion
is repugnant to the language of the Declaration of Independence that
"all men are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights
[and] among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Gov-
ernments exist for the purpose of securing these pre-existing rights. 1 3
An interesting argument has been proffered, primarily from a reli-
gious perspective, that the use of the word "inalienable" in referring to
the right to life indicates that one may not refuse life-saving medical
procedures, for to do so would be to attempt to alienate that which is
inalienable. Although purportedly speaking from an ethical rather than
a theological perspective, Paul Ramsey ultimately acknowledges the reli-
gious underpinnings of his conviction that a patient cannot morally re-
fuse treatment that will be likely to extend the patient's life.
124
Fundamental rights have never been conceived in such a one-dimen-
sional sense.
The contrary argument, which is not only more consistent with a
secular-pluralist society, but also more consistent with the concept of
individual rights in Western societies in the last half of the twentieth
century, is that the right to die (which in the context of this article means
foregoing treatment intended to sustain life) is the other side of the
right to life. One cannot have, in any truly meaningful sense, a right to
life unless one is able to elect not to go on living.
125
Too much has been made, however, of the so-called "right to die."
Particularly in the context of a discussion of fundamental but unenumer-
ated constitutional rights, one can be impaled upon such a semantic
and not to others nor to society as a whole." Thomburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 776 n.5 (1986) (Stevens,J, concurring) (empha-
sis added).
123. L. LEVY, supra note 120, at 349. Professor Levy, in arguing for the existence of
unenumerated yet fundamental rights, takes issue with the views of those such as John Ely
in DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) that the natural rights principles expressed in the
Declaration of Independence had, for all intents and purposes, disappeared by the time of
the Constitutional Convention.
124. Ramsey characterizes life as a gift from God, a perception based upon theJudeo-
Christian heritage that has influenced medicine toward a pro-life stance. Choosing any
course of action or inaction that results in death would be to throw the gift of life back in
the face of the giver. Similarly, Ramsey believes that religious faith affirms that life is a
trust; consequently we are only stewards and not owners of our lives. P. RAMSEY, ETmICS
AT THE EDGES OF LIFE 146-47 (1978).
125. Joel Feinberg makes this very point in his essay, The Concept of an Inalienable Right:
The right to die is simply the other side of the coin of the right to live .... Just as
my right to live imposes a duty on others not to kill me, so my right to die, which
it entails, imposes a duty on others not to prevent me from implementing my
choice of death, except for the purpose of determining whether that choice is
genuinely voluntary, hence truly mine.... In exercising my own choice in these
matters, I am not renouncing, abjuring, forswearing, resigning, or relinquishing
my right to life; quite the contrary, I am acting on that right by exercising it one
way or the other.... To alienate the right would be to abandon my discretion; to
waive the right is to exercise that discretion. The right itself, as opposed to that
to which I have the right, is inalienable.
J. FEINBERG, RxIGTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 249 (1980).
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sword. To argue for a constitutional "right to die" is to invite the con-
servative members of the Supreme Court to reply that there is no textual
support for the proposition that one may commit suicide and enlist
others to assist him,126just as they recently stated that there is no funda-
mental right of homosexuali to engage in sodomy.127 As stated earlier,
I am not necessarily breaking any new constitutional ground in arguing
for a right to refuse medical intervention. 128 Justice Douglas, in a con-
curring opinion in Doe v. Bolton,12 9 enumerates a few of the "Blessings of
Liberty" as that term is used in the preamble to the Constitution. The
first is the autonomous control over the development and expression of
one's intellect, tastes, and personality. The second is the freedom of
choice in the basic decisions of life such as marriage, divorce, procrea-
tion, contraception, and the education of one's children. The third is
the freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion and to care for one's
health and person.130 Decisions about whether to undergo major medi-
cal procedures, whether or not they are deemed life-saving, involve all
three of these liberties. They are an expression of one's individuality,
they are among the more important and basic decisions in one's life, and
most importantly, they are an exercise of autonomy.
In an effort to shift the focus from a narrow right to die to a broader
right to accept or refuse recommended treatment, which has a long and
distinguished history in our common law, I am compelled to address a
contention by the authors of a recent article to the effect that courts are
mistaken when they analyze right to die cases according to the same cri-
teria as right to refuse treatment cases.13 ' Morgan and Harty-Golder, in
discussing the balancing of the four state interests against the patient's
rights of autonomy, privacy and bodily integrity, suggest that it is much
more likely that the state interests will prevail in treatment refusal cases.
The authors characterize treatment refusals as those cases in which med-
ical treatment for curable conditions is rejected. Right-to-die cases, on
the other hand, they argue, are those in which life sustaining therapy for
an incurable condition is rejected.' 3 2 Different treatment by the courts
is warranted because the right to die, they contend, is a natural right,
superior even to fundamental constitutional rights, and therefore not
subject to balancing against state interests.' 33 Why the right to auton-
126. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
127. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). This is not to suggest, of course,
that Professor Tribe, who argued the case for Michael Hardwick, made any such simplistic
contentions. As another commentator has observed, by stating the issue in this fashion, it
is clear that the Court's conclusion preceded its analysis. Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,
102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 747 (1989).
128. See supra notes 100 and 101 and accompanying text.
129. 410 U.S. 179, 209 (Douglas, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
130. Id. at 211-14.
131. Morgan & Harty-Golder, Constitutional Development ofJudiaal Criteria in Right-To-Die
Cases: From Brain Dead To Persistent Vegetative State, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 721 (1988).
132. Id. at 724.
133. The courts in right-to-die cases have consistently maintained that the right to re-
fuse life-sustaining treatment must be balanced against the countervailing state interests
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omy, privacy and bodily integrity are not natural rights, but the right-to-
die is, the authors do not explain. The inference is that the outcome is
determinative of the right. In other words, since by their definition
treatment refusal cases always involve a rejection of a presumed success-
ful medical intervention, while right to die cases involve refusals of futile
medical interventions, then the latter constitute the exercise of a natural
right while the former do not. Yet, as a matter of sound jurisprudential
and philosophical analysis, rights, particularly natural rights that tran-
scend the constitutions of men, ought to be outcome-independent. This
is particularly true if we assume, for the sake of a parallel discussion, that
the conduct of the patient in both situations is completely self-
regarding.
Although Morgan and Harty-Golder use the term "emergencies" to
describe many of what they characterize as treatment refusal cases, they
do not appear to be referring to the presumed consent that is appropri-
ate when the patient is brought to the hospital in extremis, as a result of
which consent is presumed because the patient is unable to give it and a
surrogate is not immediately available.1 3 4 As an example, they use the
Georgetown College13 5 case, which involved an adult female Jehovah's
Witness patient who, consistent with her religious beliefs, refused to
consent to a blood transfusion. Such cases do not qualify for the pre-
sumption of consent in a medical emergency because the patient has
already refused to consent. During the time in which a genuine emer-
gency procedure would be performed, the physicians wait while their
attorneys attempt to persuade a judge to override the patient's wishes.
Finally, the authors assert that "[t]he refusal of life-prolonging pro-
cedures does not have the adverse impact on society or government that
is often involved in the compelled treatment situation."'1 3 6 Since no ex-
planation for this remarkable statement is provided, the reader is left to
speculate what may have been intended. One might reasonably infer
that the authors contend that the state does indeed have a proprietary
interest in its citizens, but that the justification for asserting that interest
in the former situation is neglible because of the terminal condition of
such patients.
Another commentator, Professor Ellman, has suggested, in refer-
ence to the Cruzan case, that attempting to make constitutional the right
to refuse treatment is misguided and superfluous.1 3 7 Ellman's conten-
tion is that the balancing of the individual's interests and the state's in-
terests will take place in any event; however, he does concede that if the
right to refuse treatment has constitutional dimensions, then every state
regardless of their theoretical basis. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 45,
549 N.E.2d 292,297 (1989); In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321,348-9,486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985).
134. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at 36.
135. In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Jones v. President of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
136. Morgan & Harty-Golder, supra note 131, at 764.
137. Ellman, Cruzan v. Harmon and the Dangerous Claim That Others Can Exercise an Incapaci-
tated Patient's Right to Die, 29 JURiMEmcs J. 389, 393-4 (1989).
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must weigh these interests in the same fashion under Supreme Court
scrutiny.' 38 If the right to refuse treatment is a fundamental right, there
would seem to be much more significance to this point than Ellman ac-
knowledges.' 3 9 Thereafter, he throws down the gauntlet with regard to
any purported constitutional right of surrogates to refuse life sustaining
treatment for incompetents, contending that it would require an entirely
different rationale than the patient's right to autonomy and "no such
rationale has been offered."' 40 Later in this section I will discuss such a
rationale.
The ultimate significance of a constitutional right to refuse treat-
ment is potentially reduced when one considers the state action require-
ment. This is because the constitutional guarantees of individual rights
were established to protect citizens from infringement by the govern-
ment-state or federal. 14 1 Thus it would appear that a judicially recog-
nized constitutional right to refuse treatment would not protect a
patient from forced treatment by private physicians or hospitals; how-
ever, consideration of the basis of treatment refusal case decisions
clearly demonstrates the error of such an assertion. Federal and state
courts invoke the four state interests in all treatment refusal cases
14 2
regardless of whether the parties to the litigation are private or public.
Therefore, so long as state interests are balanced by the court against a
patient's right to refuse treatment, state action is present and the federal
constitutional right to refuse treatment is applicable.
1 43
C. Sources of the Constitutional Right to Privacy
Before undertaking a discussion and analysis of the proposition that
the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the right to refuse treat-
ment by both competent and incompetent adults, it is appropriate to
explore the purported constitutional sources of the general principle of
privacy. The 1965 Supreme Court decision in Griswold v. Connecticut 
14 4
is widely regarded as the first in which the Court struck down a state
statute on constitutional privacy grounds that were based on a provision
other than the fourth amendment.145 The foreshadowing of the recog-
138. Id. at 394.
139. In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943), the
Court stated: "The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy .... Fundamental rights may not be submit-
ted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."
140. Ellman, supra note 137, at 395.
141. See generally, L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 18-1, at 1688-91.
142. See supra notes 34-52 and 86-94 and accompanying text.
143. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948), stand for the proposition that state court application of common law tort and
contract principles in an unconstitutional fashion will also serve as the basis for a finding
of state action even though the actual parties to the litigation are private.
144. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
145. Connecticut's law made it a criminal offense for married persons to use contracep-
tives, or for physicians to aid or abet the offense by providing couples with contraceptives
or information regarding their use. Such a regulation, it was held, invaded the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees (penumbras and emana-
tions from the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments).
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nition of a constitutional right to privacy dates back to the language of
Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States.1
46
One of the major problems with the constitutional right to privacy as
conceived by Justice Brandeis, established by Griswold, and subsequently
applied in cases such as Roe v. Wade, 14 7 is that its breadth and depth are
unknown. Whether it reaches far enough to preclude a particular inva-
sive act of government will not be known unless the Supreme Court
agrees to rule on a case presenting the issue. Until Cruzan, lower courts
and litigants could only speculate upon a constitutional right to refuse
treatment.
Many commentators of the privacy cases and the constitutional
principles upon which they are or arguably should be based, look pri-
marily to two provisions-the ninth amendment and the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. I shall consider them
in that order.
There is little written about the ninth amendment, 148 and so little
reliance upon it in constitutional jurisprudence, that when it is referred
to at all it is almost always as the "forgotten ninth amendment." In-
deed, the only extensive scholarly treatment of the amendment bears
that very title. 14 9 It begins with an important observation: "There is no
clause in the Constitution except the ninth amendment which makes a
declaration of the sovereignty and dignity of the individual."' 150 Much
of the text consists of an argument for the proposition that the ninth
146. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled, Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967). Justice Burger, in his dissent in the Georgetown College case, found the
language compelling in its relevance to cases involving the refusal of medical treatment
and efforts by physicians and judges to overrule it:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, plea-
sure, and satisfaction of life can be found in material things. They sought to pro-
tect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone - the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1016 (1964) (BurgerJ, dissenting)
(emphasis added) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
Justice Burger then went on to elaborate on the above language and bring it to bear
directly on the facts of the case before him:
Nothing in this utterance suggests that Justice Brandeis thought an individual
possessed these rights only as to sensible beliefs, valid thoughts, reasonable emo-
tions, or well-founded sensations. I suggest that he intended to include a great
many foolish, unreasonable, and even absurd ideas which do not conform, such
as refusing medical treatment even at great risk.
Id. at 1017 (emphasis in original).
147. 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
148. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IX: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
149. B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NirH AMENDMENT (1955). Even the book itself
seems to have been largely ignored or forgotten, for more recent commentators have lit-
tie, if anything, to say about it. I will take issue with this neglect, for there is much in the
work which has relevance and significance to a purported constitutional right to refuse
treatment that would prevent state courts and legislatures from usurping a patient's right
to privacy, autonomy, and bodily integrity in healthcare decisionmaking.
150. Id. at 1.
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amendment is the elucidation of the Founders' solemn belief that indi-
viduals possess natural rights that are antecedent and superior to any
specifically referenced in the Bill of Rights, and as such can not be re-
voked or materially circumscribed by either federal or state govern-
ments. 15 1 Patterson might well have been referring to the cases in
which state courts have forced treatment upon competent and uncon-
senting adults when he observed:
We shudder to think what might have been the result if our
human liberties had been left to find determination by the
courts of [the] states. The undisputed truth is that in practi-
cally all important instances where human rights have been de-
nied, it has been at the hands of the government of a state or its
inferior subdivisions. 1
52
Patterson's basic thesis is that the Founders placed the ninth
amendment in the Bill of Rights in a prescient recognition that man as a
social animal is evolving and advancing. Not only was it impossible to
enumerate all of the rights that an individual possessed as against others
or government, but it was even more difficult to anticipate the ways in
which those rights would need to be articulated three hundred years
later. The ninth amendment should be the principle vehicle for that
process. 153 In concluding words that bear great significance to the pro-
clivity of courts, as the previous section has demonstrated, to persist-
ently balance the countervailing interests of the state against the right of
the individual to make his own private medical treatment decisions, he
observes:
Whenever we lose the distinction between individual liberty
and the necessities of the general welfare, the virtue of our
form of government is lost, and we have nothing but the worst
form of tyranny, which is a despotism imposed by the force of
and under the name of the people themselves. We will have,
then, nothing that is preferable to any other form of tyranny or
despotism elsewhere.
154
Another constitutional scholar, Leonard Levy, believes that Griswold
marks the inception of ninth amendment jurisprudence. 155 Like Patter-
son, Levy vigorously argues that the ninth amendment is compelling evi-
dence of the Framers' distrust of all government, not just the federal
one. James Madison, in response to the contention that a Bill of Rights
was unnecessary because the states constitutionally protected freedom,
151. See id. at 7-20.
152. Id. at 42.
153. With his own piece of prescience, Patterson suggests that:
The right of privacy may be such a right [now making an appearance].... While
the courts seem to feel that it should exist, there is a great timidity and lack of
forthrightness in the protection of this right, because its existence is not to be
found in the written and enumerated law.
Id. at 55.
154. Id. at 61.
155. L. LEvy, supra note 120, at 267-68 (1988). Levy notes that prior to 1965 the ninth
amendment was the subject of only incidental references by the Court, whereas in the
fifteen years afterward it was invoked in over 1200 state and federal cases.
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asserted first that a number of the states had no, or at least a very defec-
tive, Bill of Rights, and second that the states constituted a greater dan-
ger to individual liberty than the national government.1 5 6 It is from this
historical perspective that one must argue for the proposition that the
rights "retained by the people" according to the ninth amendment can-
not reasonably be interpreted as "retained by the state govern-
ments."1 5 7 These unenumerated rights are of individuals as against
society or any level of government. As expressed by the late Judge Cra-
ven of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the principles embodied in
the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to the Constitution and
the ninth amendment provide that the rights of persons in the United
States are not confined to those specifically enumerated.'
5 8
Clearly, the ninth amendment has no substantive content whatso-
ever. One commentator has described it as "a license to constitutional
decisionmakers to look beyond the substantive commands of the Consti-
tutional text to protect fundamental rights not expressed therein."'
59
The more conservative members of the United States Supreme Court
are decidedly uncomfortable with this "license" to the extent they even
acknowledge its existence. There is also apparent acceptance by the
same segment of the Court of the proposition that overturning state leg-
islation that does not clearly contravene an enumerated right constitutes
"the mere imposition of the Justices' own values upon the States."' 60 I
shall address this contention further as I attempt to give credence to a
constitutional right to privacy in fundamental healthcare decisions.
16 1
The fourteenth amendment,' 62 as a source for an unenumerated
constitutional right, suffers from much the same "weakness" as the
ninth amendment in that the substantive content of phrases such as
156. Id. at 272-73.
157. Justice Scalia's arguments in Cruzan to the contrary notwithstanding.
158. Craven, Personhood: The Right To Be Let Alone, 1976 DuKE L. J. 699, 705.
159. Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STA. L. REv. 703, 709 (1975).
Professor Grey goes on to point out that if the disciples of the "pure interpretive model"
such as the latejustice Black, ChiefJustice Rehnquist,Judge Bork, andJohn Ely prevailed,
a radical purge of established constitutional doctrine would be necessary, including funda-
mental procedural fairness in civil and criminal proceedings, prohibitions on racial dis-
crimination by the federal government, the application of the Bill of Rights to the states,
and the requirement of strict scrutiny when fundamental interests are affected. Id. at 713.
160. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). Two concerns relating to the pres-
ent discussion arise from this proposition. First, the sense that Justice White and his col-
leagues on the majority in Bowers equate "the States" with "the people" of the ninth
amendment. Constitutional history, of which Professor Levy contends most Supreme
Court justices have been abysmally ignorant (L. LEvy, supra note 120, at 300), is to the
contrary. Second, one must ask how the ninth amendment can ever be utilized to protect
individual rights against state infringement, lacking as it does any substantive content,
without that use being subject to Justice White's "imposition of values" charge.
161. See infra notes 162-180 and accompanying text.
162. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" and "life, lib-
erty, or property" must be provided by the Court, and to do so requires
that the justices confront the current meaning of these phrases. The
Founders could not have anticipated that one of the perils faced by indi-
viduals in this era would be the onslaught of the technological impera-
tive of modem medicine, and that the physician-patient relationship
might be transformed, through the imposition of court-ordered treat-
ment, to a prison house in which manacles and chains are replaced by
tubes and wires. Does that mean that we, as a civilized society under the
rule of law of the greatest charter of freedom ever drafted, must look
away from this assault or pretend that it does not exist because the
Founders neglected to anticipate this scenario and enumerate a consti-
tutional right to be free from unwanted medical treatment? 163 Profes-
sor Black, commenting on Griswold, observed that:
If our constitutional law could permit such a thing to happen,
then we might almost as well not have any law of constitutional
limitations, partly because the thing is so outrageous in itself,
and partly because a constitutional law inadequate to deal with
such an outrage would be too feeble, in method and doctrine,
to deal with a great amount of equally outrageous material.
Virtually all the intimacies, privacies and autonomies of life
would be regulable by the legislature .... 164
Such an autonomy and privacy is the right to refuse medical treatment,
which the state seeks to regulate by means of the imposition of its inter-
ests through the judiciary, and through legislation such as that in Mis-
souri discussed in the Cruzan case. 16 5 Given the sentiments expressed by
the majority in the Bowers decision, it will be a daunting task to persuade
the Court in future cases that legitimate constitutional interpretation justi-
fies the conclusion that the right to a wholly or predominately self-re-
garding determination to refuse medical treatment rests among the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. Yet, are we
not embarking upon the ultimate totalitarian nightmare when we sug-
gest that the constitutional right of privacy does not reach far enough to
protect the individual from forced medical treatment which serves the
interests of the state?16
6
163. There is an ironic parallel between, on the one hand, the originalist view that if
the Founders did not elucidate a right to refuse treatment it is therefore not of constitu-
tional dimensions, and the Missouri Supreme Court's view that if a patient, while compe-
tent, did not specifically and solemnly reject the treatment now being administered to him,
then his surrogate cannot lawfully refuse it on his behalf.
164. Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 32 (1970).
165. Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010 (1986).
166. In arguing thus, one admittedly is moving beyond a narrow and rigid concept of
what it means to be a citizen of a nation toward the concept of what it means to be a human
being, a person in the fullest sense of the word that transcends its historic constitutional
dimension. I do so, however, in good company. First, Professor Tribe, addressing the
constitutional dimension of personhood, states:
The Constitution... contains no discussion of the right to be a human being; no
definition of a person; and, indeed, no express provisions guaranteeing to per-
sons the right to carry on their lives protected from the 'vicissitudes of the polit-
ical process' by a zone of privacy or a right of personhood. . . . But the
Constitution's is not a totalitarian design, depending for its success upon the ho-
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D. Autonomy v. Privacy
The constitutional right to privacy suffers from many congenital in-
firmities, not the least of which is the long period of time which passed
in the history of our constitutional jurisprudence before it was discov-
ered and applied. This late arrival of the principle suggests to some that
it is probably illegitimate, something created out of the skillful liberal
positioning of smoke and mirrors, rather than properly derived from
solid and long-standing principles of constitutional interpretation.1
6 7
Another infirmity, and one more critical to the right to refuse treatment,
is the interchangeable use by courts and commentators of the terms
"privacy" and "autonomy."1 68 Professor Henkin correctly observes:
That the Court cites search and seizure cases as precedent for
its new zone of autonomy suggests that it does not distinguish
between privacy and autonomy and may be treating them both
as aspects of "the right to be let alone." But they are, I think,
different notions conceptually, with different philosophical,
political, social (and, one might have thought legal) assump-
tions and consequences; they may look different also if viewed
as aspects of the confrontation of private right with public
good. 16
9
mogenization or depersonalization of humanity. The judiciary has thus reached
into the Constitution's spirit and structure, and has elaborated from the spare
text an idea of the 'human' and a conception of 'being' not merely contemplated
but required.
L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 15-3, at 1308 (footnote omitted). Second, anticipating only
slightly the totalitarian nature of the imposition of the demands of the technological im-
perative upon unwilling patients by courts which worship at the altar of the interests of the
state, Professor Kurland observes:
[W]e have arrived at the stage of technological development that Orwell so
gphically described in his, to me, still shocking novel, 1984. The problem of
freedom is essentially the problem of avoiding the consequences of that technol-
ogy so that Orwell's vision might, despite our technological achievements, be
frustrated. With government in control of so many essentials of our life, where in
the Constitution can we turn for haven against the impositions of 1984? Until
now, we have looked to the Bill of Rights, substantive due process, and substan-
tive equal protection. But nowhere in these provisions is there a basis for claims
to the privileges and immunities that will become more and more necessary....
[M]ost of all, I should hope to find among the privileges and immunities of citi-
zenship, that most fundamental of rights, still without a base in the Constitution,
the right that Mr. Justice Brandeis called 'the right to be let alone.'
Kurland, The Privileges and Immunities Clause: Its Hour Come Round at Last?, 1972 WASH.
U.L.Q. 405, 419 (footnotes omitted).
167. John Ely, for example, in his critique of the extension of the right to privacy to a
woman's decision whether or not to maintain her pregnancy, laments: "What is frighten-
ing about Roe is that this super-protected right is not inferable from the language of the
Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any general
value derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation's governmental struc-
ture." Ely, The Wages of Cying Wo4 A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 935-36
(1973).
168. Consider, for example, the following: "Privacy will be defined here as an auton-
omy of control over the intimacies of personal identity. Autonomy, identity, and intimacy
are all necessary (and normally sufficient) for the proper invocation of the concept of pri-
vacy." Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 233, 236 (1977). As we know
from the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, a current majority of the Court does not agree,
at least when the issue is framed as "the fundamental right [of] homosexuals to engage in
sodomy." 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
169. Henkin, Privacy andAutonomy, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1425 (1974). See also Allen,
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The compelling significance of this lost distinction shall become readily
apparent as I discuss the right to refuse treatment in the case of an in-
competent as opposed to a competent patient.17 0 Before doing so, how-
ever, let us complete the review of privacy's infirmities. There is, of
course, the fact that it is among the unenumerated rights, one which had
to be discovered lurking amidst the penumbras and emanations of the
first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. 17 1 The pall of illegiti-
macy that such rights have about them in the eyes of some members of
the Court is probably best expressed by Justice White in this language
from the opinion of the Court in Bowers:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little
or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Consti-
tution .... There should be, therefore, great resistance to ex-
pand the substantive reach of [the Due Process] Clauses,
particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights
deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessar-
ily takes to itself further authority to govern the country with-
out express constitutional authority.
172
Proponents of a constitutional right to refuse treatment argue that it
should be beyond dispute that the right to accept or decline invasive
medical procedures cannot reasonably be regarded as a "redefinition"
of rights that are fundamental. It is, rather, a recognition of the fact that
control over one's body in such a way as to preclude being made the
slave of medical technology is absolutely and indisputably inherent in
the concept of ordered liberty.'
73
The final infirmity of the right of privacy is that it has been said to
apply only to those "matters ... fundamentally affecting a person."'
174
Demonstrating that one's identity as a person is unconstitutionally com-
promised by some state action spawns an analysis that is tortuous and
ambiguous at best, and always easy prey to the disciples of Justice Black.
In a recent article, a commentator has suggested an analytical methodol-
ogy that avoids legal forays into the existential thicket of personhood.17 5
Rather than focusing upon what the state is trying to forbid and asking
whether there is a fundamental constitutional right to do so, Rubenfeld
suggests that the focus be upon what is being produced by the state's
action or prohibition, "the real effects that conformity with the law pro-
Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 461,467
(1987), wheiein she argues that the Supreme Court's right-to-privacy jurisprudence is
flawed by the confusion of liberty with privacy. While she argues that abortion rights pres-
ent issues of autonomy, not privacy, my contention is that refusal of treatment cases
squarely present both aspects of the concept of constitutional privacy.
170. See infra notes 191-199 and accompanying text.
171. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
172. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-5 (1986).
173. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
174. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
175. Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HAsv. L. REv. 737, 783 (1989).
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duces at the level of everyday lives and social practices." 17 6 Applying his
analytical method to persons seeking to be disengaged from life-support
systems, Rubenfeld observes:
For right-to-die patients, being forced to live is in fact to be
forced into a particular, all-consuming, totally dependent, and
indeed rigidly standardized life: the life of one confined to a
hospital bed, attached to medical machinery, and tended to by
medical professionals. It is a life almost totally occupied. The
person's body is, moreover, so far expropriated from his own
will, supposing that he seeks to die, that the most elemental
acts of existence-such as breathing, digesting, and circulating
blood-are forced upon him by an external agency.
177
It is the totalitarian nature of such state action, he argues, such as re-
quiring that a woman bear an unwanted child or that homosexuals disa-
vow or completely sublimate their sexual preferences, that should be a
sufficient basis for invocation of the right to privacy. One might ask,
however, in refusal of treatment cases, where the analogy is more that of
a strategic incursion rather than a total occupation by the medical pro-
fessionals, whether this type of analysis would still result in an invoca-
tion of the right to privacy to protect the patient from court-ordered
treatment.
Let us turn, now, to the way in which the distinctions between au-
tonomy and privacy, competence and incompetence, are interwoven.
The Supreme Court privacy decisions establish certain zones of privacy
in which the state may not dictate how an individual thinks, feels or acts
except where a compelling public interest can be shown and no less bur-
densome means are available to protect that public interest. The right
of privacy in the broad constitutional sense has also been characterized
as "the right to make choices and decisions." 178 Thus privacy takes on a
figure/ground kind of quality, with the background being zones of pre-
sumed state noninterference and the figure being the exercise of per-
sonal autonomy within these zones. Much of the discussion of privacy in
healthcare decisionmaking, at least as a purported constitutional right,
has concentrated on the incompetent or questionably competent pa-
tient. Focusing on the figure of autonomous decisionmaking and action
rather than the background of a zone of privacy, some commentators
argue that it belies truth and logic to discuss a constitutional right to
refuse treatment that survives incompetence. 179 Earlier in this article I
176. Id.
177. Id. at 795.
178. Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideas in the Constitution, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 445, 454 (1983).
179. Ellman supra, note 137, at 394. Professor Ellman, discussing the Cruzan case and
others involving permanently unconscious patients, contends that, "[a] constitutional right
to decide one's own treatment for oneself can thus have no application to her case." He is
particularly critical of Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988), the most recent case
to permit the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment on the basis of a patient's constitu-
tional right to decide her own treatment. The fatal flaw in this reasoning, it is argued, is
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
mentioned the gauntlet thrown down by Professor Ellman. 180 To be
precise, his contention is stated as follows:
Since the autonomy principle is foundational to any constitu-
tional claim that individuals may decide for themselves whether
to accept or refuse life-sustaining treatment, the constitutional
claim fails in this [the Cruzan] case. The family's claim to decide
cannot be piggybacked on Nancy's autonomy. Their claim re-
quires an entirely different rationale. Rather surprisingly, since
many have made the claim before the Cruzans, no such ration-
ale has been offered.181
My position is that privacy in a broad constitutional sense, derived from
cases before and after Griswold, provides ample precedent for what I
shall hereinafter describe as a presumed guardianship of the family in-
tended to protect incompetent patients, such as Nancy Cruzan, from un-
warranted state intervention in their private medical affairs.
An important aspect of the physician-patient relationship is the
psycho-social quality deriving from its origins, particularly as described
by Leon Kass. 182 Dr. Kass correctly observed that in undertaking a ther-
apeutic relationship with a patient, the physician unavoidably enters the
intimate life-world of the patient, which he indicates is the family. It is
an incontrovertible fact that in the great majority of cases, the patient
has close family involved with him in the process of contending with a
major illness. It has become the custom and practice of physicians over
centuries to work with the patient and his nuclear, and often even ex-
tended family, to help return the patient to health. It is, therefore, both
distressing and anomalous to find courts treating family involvement in
decisions declining treatment as inherently suspicious.' 8 3 Professor
that the patient never expressed a view on this subject while competent, so the actual
decision to discontinue treatment is being made by the patient's family.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, first in In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647
(1976), and more recently in In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 359-60, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229
(1985), established what has become the majority view that the right of an adult who was
once competent to determine the course of her medical treatment remains intact even
when she is no longer able to assert that right.
180. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
181. Ellman, supra note 137, at 395 (footnote omitted). Ellman does not say whether
he agrees with the position of the Missouri Supreme Court that a guardian's power to
exercise third party choice arises from the state's parens patriae power rather than the con-
stitutional rights of the patient when competent. In so holding, the Missouri Supreme
Court concludes that the other courts which permitted surrogates to order the withdrawal
of life-support from incompetents mistakenly assumed that the surrogate's authority to do
so was derivative of the incompetent's right to decide, if competent. Cruzan v. Harmon,
760 S.W.2d 408, 424-25 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub noa. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1190). In the discussion that follows I will contend that on this
point, as with so many others throughout the majority opinion in Cruzan, the Missouri
Supreme Court demonstrates its view that people exist to serve the interests of the state,
rather than the state existing to protect the rights of its citizens.
182. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
183. In New Jersey, for example, the legislature created the Office of the Ombudsman
for the Institutionalized Elderly (the "Granny Doe" squad) and charged it with the respon-
sibility to guard against "abuse" of such patients. No life-supporting therapy may be with-
held or withdrawn from institutionalized patients on the basis of a decision by a surrogate
decisionmaker unless the patient has been adjudicated incompetent and a court-appointed
guardianship created. Thereafter, the request by the guardian to withhold or withdraw
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Meisel, in his recent work, The Right to Die, discusses the crucial role of
the family in treatment decisions for incompetent patients:
The importance of the role of the family and the doctor is high-
lighted by the self-evident fact that the vast majority of treat-
ment decisions relative to persons who are incompetent by
reason of senility or retardation are made for them, by their
family and the doctor, without court proceedings. This prac-
tice is sanctioned not merely by tradition but by the institu-
tional limitations in the ability of courts to make day-to-day
treatment decisions, even if restricted to treatments of a poten-
tially life-saving or life-prolonging nature. 184
A similar disrespect for the traditional role of the family in making
healthcare decisions on behalf of minors is evidenced by the entire Baby
Doe scenario.1 8 5 In both instances, efforts on the part of state legisla-
tures or federal regulators to cause any refusal of consent to automati-
cally trigger governmental inquiry or a finding of neglect renders
surrogate decisionmaking authority meaningless. This also reflects the
profoundly paternalistic and pessimistic notion that political functiona-
ries should be presumed better able to make private healthcare deci-
sions than the family.
1 8 6
The lineage of the family as the pre-eminent social unit, at least as a
general proposition, is long and distinguished. Consider, for example,
the observation that "the family unit does not simply co-exist with our
constitutional system but is an integral part of it, for our political system
is superimposed on and presupposes a social system of family units, not
just of isolated individuals. No assumption more deeply underlies our
life-support, even with the concurrence of the treating physician, must be reported to the
Ombudsman and treated by him as a case of potential abuse. In all such cases of potential
abuse, the Ombudsman must investigate and make a report to the Commissioner of
Human Services within twenty-four hours. The NewJersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy
98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) approved of this entire process, which makes no effort
to distinguish between patients who have close family and patients who do not. Id. at 341-
43, 486 A.2d at 1239-42. What makes the ruling still more inexplicable is the language
from the same court in two cases decided only two years later. See infra note 190.
184. A. MEISEL, supra note 12, at 152 n.17.
185. For a concise review of the Baby Doe litigation and regulatory history, see FuR-
ROW,JoHNSoN,JosT & ScHwARTz, HEALTH LAW, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS, 939-48
(West 1987).
186. Goldstein, Medical Carefor the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy,
86 YALE LJ. 645, 651 (1977).
James J. Kilpatrick, a noted journalist and political commentator of conservative per-
suasion, offered this opinion of the federal government's role in cases such as Baby Doe:
It simply is no business of the federal government.., to intrude upon the in-
formed and reasonable decisions of a family in such intimate matters as this one.
The federal rules say that surgery cannot be denied "when such denial is based
on anticipated mental impairment, paralysis or incontinence of such child rather
than on reasonable medical judgments that treatment would be futile or unlikely
of success."
In the name of the Constitution of the United States, how did we get into such
Orwellian nonsense? The surgeon general at the moment is a nice fellow by the
name of C. Everett Koop. He too must have the very best of intentions. But did
he run for God in some August primary? Did he get elected? What are his cre-
dentials-or what are a judge's credentials-for saying to the anguished parents,
"Thou shalt operate!"?
Raleigh News and Observer, Nov. 17, 1983, at A5.
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society ... .,,187 It follows from this assumption that the privacy doc-
trine protects family relationships as much as, if not more than, individ-
ual autonomy. Indeed, it is through the proper nurturing role of the
family that individuals develop into mature adults with the sense of iden-
tity and unique personhood of which autonomous acts are the ultimate
definitional expression. As an institution that predates the state and
hence and has a raison d'lere separate and apart from it, the family cannot
be as easily dislodged as the primary decisionmaker for its own as the
Missouri Supreme Court suggests.188 The significance of the family as a
social phenomenon is not simply its role in the rearing of children. Nev-
ertheless, in cases like Cruzan and O'Connor, the courts seem to be saying
that once a person reaches majority and the existential realm of individ-
ual autonomy, he is immediately and irrevocably jettisoned from the
protective and nurturing sphere of the family. Thereafter, if he should
ever again be legally incapacitated, as during his minority, then his fam-
ily, immediate, nuclear or extended, shall be without legal or moral au-
thority to act on his behalf except with the prior adjudication and
approval of the state.' 8 9 Such a principle is at odds with the history of
western civilization and the predisposition of a majority of the citizens of
the United States.'
90
187. L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 15-20, at 1414 (quoting Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest
and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its ritics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765, 772-73 (1973)).
188. The parens patriae power of the state to protect the interests of minors and incom-
petent adults was intended to protect those who, by virtue of unfortunate circumstances,
had no family that could or would look after them. It is a distortion of this original con-
cept, at the very least, to suggest that when loving family members of formerly competent
adults are present and seeking to act in the best interests of their loved one who happens
to be a patient in an institution, the state can contravene their principled actions to further
interests of its own. In this regard, the authors of a recent article argue:
Instead of permitting families to make a decision to terminate treatment in cir-
cumstances where such termination is considered good medical practice under
standards promulgated by the A.M.A., among others, the Missouri court ruled
that Cruzan must continue to be treated for the sake of the state, in upholding its
"unlimited" interest in human life.
Annas, Glantz & Mariner, The Right of Privacy Protects the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 263J.
A.M.A. 858, 861 (1990) (emphasis added).
189. Professor Tribe refers to this phenomenon as "the recurring puzzle of liberal indi-
vidualism: once the state, whether acting through its courts or otherwise, has 'liberated'
the child-and the adult-from the shackles of such intermediate groups as the family,
what is to defend the individual against the combined tyranny of the state and her own
alienation?" L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 15-20, at 1418 (footnote omitted).
190. In this regard, consider the following language from recent New Jersey Supreme
Court decisions:
"The law has traditionally respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter .... We believe that this tradition of respect for and confidence in the family should
ground our approach to the treatment of the sick." In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 355-356,
529 A.2d 404, 414 (1987).
"The decisions of patients' families should determine what sort of medical care perma-
nently unconscious patients [who have not left clear directives] receive." In reJobes, 108
NJ. 394, 417, 529 A.2d 434, 446 (1987).
"Public opinion ... support[s] th[is] approach to surrogate decisionmaking. Pub-
lic opinion is relevant in the withdrawal-of-treatment cases that we decide today
because they present society with moral, social, technological, and philosophical
problems that transcend legal issues... Every recent survey that we have found
indicates that society believes that a patient's family members should function as
his or her surrogate decisionmakers."
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A long line of United States Supreme Court decisions stand for the
proposition that there exists a "private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter," at least not without a compelling reason.19 1 These
cases relate to the education of children,19 2 decisions regarding procre-
ation,195 and marriage and divorce.' 9 4 In most instances they strike
down legislative efforts to regulate critical life choices such as whom one
will marry, if and when one will become a parent, and how one will raise,
care for, and educate one's children. So long as no demonstrably seri-
ous harm will be done to the social order by such private decisions, and
so long as no abuse or neglect is inflicted on children, such determina-
tions are to be made, in our constitutional scheme, by the affected indi-
viduals and not by the government. There is a recognition by the Court,
gleaned from the language in these opinions, of the vital role that pri-
vacy and intimacy play in the dynamics of the family not unlike the role
that Kass gives privacy in the dynamics of the physician-patient relation-
ship. 195 The following is an apt description of the phenomenon:
The family project of childrearing requires intimacy, a blurring
of the boundaries of individual identity. Intimacy in turn re-
quires privacy and autonomy from state intervention. To pre-
serve the necessary intimacy, and the privacy it requires....
rights language [should be] reserve[d] for the interaction of the
family members with the outside world. But for interfamilial
matters.... [p]arents can be seen as representing the interest
of the family as an integrated whole in addition to representing
their own particular interests... even when what is at issue is a
conflict in interest between the parent as individual and the
child as individual.
19 6
The role of the family in surrogate decisionmaking is a logical extension
of its nurturing role in the rearing of children. Schoeman posits several
beneficial effects from the proposition that families are entitled to a pre-
sumption of privacy and autonomy within the realm of their private deci-
sion making:
1. An intimate sphere is safeguarded from intrusions by third
parties;
2. An intimate group is able to foster meaningful autonomy
for its members;
Id. at n. 11. To put these fine sentiments in perspective, however, we must recall that this
same court mandates the involvement of the "Granny Doe" squads in every case of with-
drawal of life support from the institutionalized elderly, even where close family members
are present. See supra note 188.
191. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
192. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
193. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942).
194. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
195. L. KASS, supra note 21.
196. R. GoLDSTEIN, MOTHER-LOvE AND ABORTION 35-36 (1988) (quoting Schoeman,
Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family, 91 ETHics 6, 9 (1980)).
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3. In the case of vulnerable and compromised persons, it
secures protection from decisions by third parties such as
courts, which are inclined to discount the patient's lived
world and defer to objective standards.'
9 7
Schoeman and others 9 8 who argue for privacy and autonomy in per-
sonal and family decisionmaking are often criticized for promoting an
arbitrary and subjective decisionmaking process that is devoid of objec-
tive standards such as those that would purportedly be applied by
courts, ombudspersons, welfare agencies, and other arms of govern-
ment. Our ultimate goal in surrogate decisionmaking should not be the
"right" result, for there is no such thing; nor a perfectly objective result,
for competent adults making such critical decisions for themselves are
never perfectly objective; but rather, the result that most closely approx-
imates the one the patient would have reached if competent at the criti-
cal moment of decision. There can be no one better situated to reach
that result than the patient's loved ones.199
197. Jecker, The Role of Intimate Others in Medical Decision Making, 30 THE GERONTOLOGIST
65, 68 (1990). Number three, of course, reflects the fate of Mary O'Connor and Nancy
Cruzan, victims of the rigid application of the clear and convincing evidence standard. In
this seminal article on intimate personal relationships, of which the family is the pre-emi-
nent example, Schoeman clearly regards freedom from outside intrusion-by third parties
or the state as an entity-as a condition absolutely essential to its existence. In this regard
he states:
Privacy and autonomy provide the moral space within which concrete personal
relationships can be formed independently of general social concerns. To give
the state authority to regulate such relationships would inevitably result in a redi-
rection or 'socialization' of the relationships. We see evidence of this shift in the
doctor-patient relationship, wherein doctors are seen increasingly to have direct
responsibilities for the health of the population and not for the comfort of spe-
cific patients .... it should be recognized and made part of our reckoning that
systems of meaning can be uprooted in the process of realigning commitments.
Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents and the Moral Basis of the Family, 91 ETmICS 6,
15 (1980). Schoeman admonishes society against utilizing the instrumentality of the state
to invade and thereby disrupt institutions such as the family and other committed relation-
ships built upon love and trust, except upon a showing of some clear-and-present danger,
for the very reason that such intervention drastically and perhaps irrevocably alters them
by violating their privacy and integrity. In Schoeman's own words, "[W]hile the state is
quite limited in its ability to promote relationships, it can do much to destroy them." Id. at
16.
198. See Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J.JURIs. 1 (1969). Buchanan and
Brock also argue against a narrow and rigid definition of family: "For purposes of surro-
gate decisionmaking, the family is whomever the individual is most closely associated with.
This point is especially important at a time when alternatives to marriage and the nuclear
family are becoming more common." A. BucmN~ & D. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS
136 (1989).
199. In their recent work devoted entirely to the ethics of surrogate decisionmaking,
Buchanan and Brock cogently reinforce the primacy of the family's role in medical deci-
sionmaking for minors and the adult incapacitated over that of the medical profession or
the state. In particular, they emphasize the need to protect the family's zone of privacy:
The reasons for allowing this latitude in the family's [surrogate decisionmaking
for incapacitated adults] ... are the fact that the family is generally more knowl-
edgeable about the patient's preferences and values, and more interested in his
or her good, and the need to protect the family from unnecessary intrusions.
... [S]uitable intervention principles will allow parents considerable leeway... in
order to protect the family from intrusions that would violate the privacy which it
requires if it is to thrive as an intimate union whose value to those who participate
in it depends in great part upon its intimacy.
A. BUCHANAN & D. BROCK, supra note 198, at 147, 237. For articulation of the viewpoint
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The commingling of autonomy in decisionmaking and privacy from
outside interference is essential to the foundation for a presumed guard-
ianship of the family in healthcare decisionmaking. Some semblance of
autonomy survives incompetence to the extent that treatment decisions
are made by family who know the patient intimately and seek to decide
as he would have decided based on their personal knowledge of his
goals, beliefs and preferences. But more importantly, the coequal pri-
vacy aspect of the constitutional principle-freedom from interference
in one's private affairs by strangers in general, and the government in
particular - will be fully preserved. 20 0 Although not actually using the
term "presumed guardianship of the family," the President's Commis-
sion report on healthcare decisionmaking strongly affirms the primary
role of the family in surrogate decisionmaking for many of the reasons
already discussed.
20 1
Every public opinion poll taken in the last ten years indicates that a
clear majority of Americans believe that a patient's family members
should make medical decisions on the patient's behalf when he or she is
unable to do so. This appears to constitute the kind of evolving societal
consensus upon which the Supreme Court has historically based a deter-
mination that an unenumerated right is fundamental in a constitutional
that the family should not only be the surrogate decisionmaker, but should base such deci-
sions on consideration of the family's needs and interests as well as the patient's, see
Hardwig, What About the Family?, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (1990). Starting from the
premise that the lives of patients and those who are close to them cannot be detached for
purposes of making treatment decisions, Hardwig argues:
Instead of starting with our usual assumption that physicians are to serve the
interests of the patient, we must build our theories on a very different assump-
tion: The medical and nonmedical interests of both the patient and other mem-
bers of the patient's family are to be considered.... I would argue that we must
build our theory of medical ethics on the presumption of equality: the interests
of patients and family members are morally to be weighed equally; medical and
nonmedical interests of the same magnitude deserve equal consideration in mak-
ing treatment decisions.
Id. at 7.
200. In the case of incompetent adults for whom treatment decisions are made by fam-
ily surrogates, and minor children for whom decisions are made by parents, the decision
can be said to be that of the surrogate or the child in the sense that it most closely approxi-
mates his interests and hence should be free from state interference. For further elabora-
tion of this viewpoint see Garvey, Freedom of Choice in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 94 HARV.
L. REv. 1756, 1782-84 (1981).
Other commentators have also alluded to a constitutional dimension to the role of the
family as surrogate decisionmaker for incompetent patients. See, e.g., Areen, The Legal Sta-
tus of Consent Obtained from Families of Adult Patients to Withhold or Withdraw Treatment, 258 J.
A.M.A. 229, 234 (1987); Comment,Judicial Postponement of Death Recognition: The Tragic Case
of Mary O'Connor, 15 AM. J. L. & MED. 301, 327-28 (1989); Note, Privacy, Family and Medical
Decisionmakingfor Persistent Vegetative Patients, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 713, 732-33 (1990).
201. The Commission report urges utilization of close family as surrogates, rather than
judges, guardians having no direct familiarity with the patient, or welfare agencies, be-
cause the family is most concerned and knowledgeable about the patient's goals, prefer-
ences and values, the family is entitled to recognition as an important social unit that
should be considered the responsible decisionmaker in matters intimately affecting its
members and the family is an institution that requires a protected sphere of privacy and
autonomy in order to flourish. For those reasons, the state should not intrude, except for
compelling reasons, in highly personal matters about which opinions in society range
widely. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & Bi-
OMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 127-32 (1982).
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sense.20 2 Given the weight of legal and ethical authority behind the sur-
rogate decisionmaking role of the family, and its support among the
population generally, a plausible basis exists for finding a constitutional
dimension to a presumed guardianship of the family.
As other commentators who -have argued for a presumption of fam-
ily decisionmaking for incapacitated adult patients have acknowledged,
such a presumption must be rebuttable in order to prevent the rare in-
stances of abuse.203 The important procedural difference under a con-
stitutionally-based presumed guardianship of the family, at least where
the family is in agreement on the nontreatment decision, or there is a
hierarchy established and the highest-ranking person disagrees with the
physician's recommendation of continued treatment, is that the physi-
cian or institution must either accept the surrogate's decision or carry
the burden to challenge it in court. Liability would attach if neither were
done. The most significant difference from the practice currently fol-
lowed in the majority of such actions is that in any litigation to challenge
the surrogate's decision, the physician or institution should have the
burden of proving, arguably by clear and convincing evidence, that the
surrogate's choice was unreasonable or not in the best interests of the
patient.20 4 As Justice Brennan points out in Cruzan, if there is a funda-
mental constitutional right to refuse medical treatment that survives in-
capacity, then Missouri's clear and convincing evidence standard is not
the least restrictive means for the state properly to protect patients from
abuse by uncaring or ignorant surrogates and unethical physicians.
20 5
To adequately protect the privacy of the patient, the state should have
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the deci-
sion of the surrogate is not what the now incompetent patient would
have chosen for herself or is not in her best interest if there is no evi-
dence of what she would have decided. Furthermore, if the counter-
vailing state interests are properly made an issue in the case, then the
proponent would have the burden of establishing a compelling reason
why they should prevail over the patient's constitutional right to pri-
vacy. 20 6 As noted earlier, the most tragic and demoralizing aspect of the
Cruzan decision is that the process that was upheld completely fails to
consider the patient's interests.
E. Consequences of a Constitutional Right to Refuse Treatment
Commentators such as Ellman predict dire consequences if such a
right, exercisable by surrogates on behalf of incompetent patients, were
202. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLICAL PROCEss 73-75
(1980).
203. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, supra note 5, at 440.
204. Id. at 441.
205. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, I 10 S. Ct. 2841, 2872 (1990) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
206. For a detailed argument in favor of the proposition that there should be a rebutta-
ble presumption that all citizens have a right to conduct their lives free of governmental
regulation, at least as to self-regarding conduct, see Craven, supra note 158, at 706.
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to be elucidated by the Supreme Court.2 0 7 Such "predictions," how-
ever, are based upon patently erroneous assumptions such as that of the
family being made "the unreviewable arbiter" of treatment decisions,
something which no one has advocated in any of the major right to re-
fuse treatment cases.2 08 Ellman and others also argue that the Court
should abstain from finding a constitutional right in this area in order to
leave the state legislatures free to weigh competing considerations. 20 9
The arguments to the contrary are much more compelling in light of
events in the last decade. The New Jersey Supreme Court has decided
more significant "right to die" cases than any other court because the
NewJersey legislature has failed to produce any relevant legislation dur-
ing the more than ten years between Quinlan andJobes.2 10 Furthermore,
phrases such as "right to life" and "right to die" are testimony to the
politicization of these issues to an extent which virtually insures that the
legislative outcome will not be the product of a trenchant, enlightened
and interdisciplinary interchange, but rather the strident clash of single-
issue politics.
2 1 1
Recognition of a constitutional right to refuse treatment and a pre-
sumed guardianship of the family as described above would almost cer-
tainly reduce the volume of litigation. First, it would give comfort to
responsible healthcare providers that they would not be held civilly or
criminally liable for respecting the constitutional rights of patients and
their families. Second, from the standpoint of benefits conferred against
burdens imposed, the choice between abiding by the decision of the pa-
tient or his family and seeking to override it in the face of a presumption
of validity would naturally limit the legal challenges to those appropriate
cases in which the patient is demonstrably incompetent and the family
unreasonably withholds consent to treatment that is clearly in the pa-
tient's best interest.
Another major impact of the recognition of such a constitutional
right may be the invalidation of a number of state living will statutes.
Most such statutes limit their applicability to patients who are terminally
ill. In addition to the problem that there is no medical consensus as to
when or if a particular condition may be considered terminal, there is
207. ElIman, supra note 137, at 400. See also Mayo, Constitutionalizing the Right to Die, 49
Mo. L. REV. 103 (1990).
208. Ellman, supra note 137, at 400; Mayo, supra note 207, at 103.
209. Eliman supra note 137 at 401; Mayo, supra note 207, at 145.
210. Except, of course, for creation of the "Granny Doe" squads. See, e.g., McIntyre,
The Conroy Decirion: A Not-So-Good Death, in BY No EXTRAORDINARY MEAus 260 (Lynn ed.
1986).
211. In discussing abortion legislation, Tribe argues that "the customary assumption
that legislation reflects a balanced weighing of permissible objectives and is thus entitled
to judicial deference is brought to the breaking point when the challenged legislation has
been shaped in the cauldron of heated religious controversy." Tribe, Forward: Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process ofLife and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1, 31 (1973). The latest and
most grotesque example is the abortion bill which was passed by both houses of the Loui-
siana legislature. Intended to be the vehicle by which Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) is
overturned, it provided no exceptions for cases of rape or incest. The same protagonists
in the abortion debates are present and accounted for whenever legislatures debate bills
that would empower individuals with regard to decisions affecting control of their bodies.
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the more compelling fact that there are no such restrictions on a compe-
tent patient's right to refuse treatment. Since the intent of the person
who executes a living will is to exercise his legal right to accept or de-
cline certain procedures while competent, in anticipation of a time when
he might not be competent, the state may not limit that exercise without
a compelling reason. It is difficult to justify a statute that would force
incompetent patients to endure invasive procedures that are against the
wishes they expressed while competent when the same could not be
forced upon patients who never lose competence.
Similarly, a number of living will statutes exclude nutrition and hy-
dration from the medical treatments that may be refused by this form of
advance directive. With the recognition of a constitutional right to re-
fuse treatment, such a distinction between the rights of competent and
incompetent patients should be highly suspect. It is difficult to discern
why, as a matter of sound public policy, a competent patient should be
able to prevent the insertion of a nasogastric tube, but should be unable
to effectuate the same refusal by written directive in the event of future
incompetency.
212
The last significant change that would be likely to flow from the
constitutional stature of the right to refuse treatment is the manner in
which the courts have applied the third state interest, the protection of
innocent third parties. Thus far, a determinative factor as to whether
this state interest will overcome the autonomy of the patient depends on
whether the patient is the parent of any minor children who, without
her, might become wards of the state. If the patient has no children,
then of course the interest is held not to apply. If the patient has minor
children, but also has the other parent in the home to care for them, or
has at least provided for them financially in the event of her death, there
is a basis for the court to find that the state interest has been met or is
not sufficiently compelling to override the patient's interest in auton-
omy.23i On the other hand, if the patient is a single parent with no
means to provide financially for her minor children upon her death,
then a court might be inclined to rule that this state interest is suffi-
ciently compelling to justify overriding the patient's refusal of treat-
ment.2 14 Such an analysis, and the distinctions that it makes based upon
212. The ruling of the Court in Cruzan gives no clear indication of the situations in
which a state's generalized interest in maintaining the sanctity of human life may constitu-
tionally override a competent patient's refusal of treatment or the dictates of an incompe-
tent patient's living will. Under Missouri's living will statute, even if Nancy Cruzan had
properly executed a living will clearly declining tube feeding under such circumstances, it
would not have been enforced by the Missouri Supreme Court; however, it would appear
that at least five U.S. Supreme CourtJustices (the dissenters plus Justice O'Connor) would
hold that to be a violation of Nancy's liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
213. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972) (court refused to order transfu-
sion of a 34-year-old man with two children who had a wife who supported his refusal and
who had materially provided for his two minor children).
214. See, e.g., Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 353 A.2d 634 (1976) (trial court
order for a blood transfusion over the competent patient's objection upheld because he
was the sole support of a two-year-old child).
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gender, marital status, and financial position, would be very unlikely to
withstand fourteenth amendment equal protection scrutiny.2 15
It has been suggested that the issue of refusing medical treatment
has been evolving over the last two decades from medicalization in the
seventies to legalization in the eighties to politicization in the nine-
ties.2 16 The Cruzan ruling vindicates Johnson's prediction that the com-
ing decade will shift the focus of treatment refusal to the state
legislatures, which, upon the invitation ofJustice O'Connor, will serve as
the "laboratories" wherein procedures for safeguarding the liberty in-
terests of incompetent patients will be tested.
2 17
Now that the Supreme Court has recognized that the four state in-
terests can constitutionally be balanced against a patient's fourteenth
amendment liberty interest in determining what medical treatment he
will undergo, a puzzling question persists. If what is really at stake in
treatment refusal cases is one or more legitimate interests of the state
which, in at least some instances may be deemed sufficiently compelling
so as to overcome a citizen's fundamental constitutional right, why have
the states, even the most zealous among them, Missouri, tolerated such
a haphazard mode of assertion? I began this article with the acknowl-
edgement that treatment refusal lawsuits represent a distinct minority of
the universe of instances in which patients or their surrogates decline
medical treatment necessary to prevent morbidity or mortality. Assum-
ing, arguendo, that the state has one or more interests in overriding treat-
ment refusals in all such cases, then in most of them the state's interests
will never be asserted or considered. It seems paradoxical at the very
least that the states, in view of this obvious and distressing fact, would
not at some point during the last decade have created a mechanism for
insuring that these interests are always factored into the equation.
For example, rather than relying upon the serendipitous manner in
which some physicians challenge some treatment refusals by some pa-
tients, legislation might be enacted (such as created the "Granny Doe"
squads in New Jersey) that establishes an affirmative obligation on the
part of all licensed physicians to immediately report any treatment re-
fusal by a patient or surrogate that poses a likelihood of morbidity or
mortality. Once reported by the physician to the designated state au-
thority, the Attorney General could then be charged with filing an action
in the proper court so that the state's interests could be balanced against
the right of the patient to refuse treatment.
The fact that no such proposal has been implemented, or even pro-
posed to the best of my knowledge, may indicate several things. First,
such a mechanism would be extremely cumbersome and costly. Second,
it would provoke the wrath of organized medicine and civil liberties in-
215. For a discussion of the level of scrutiny required when state classifications burden
a fundamental constitutional right, see L. TRIBE supra note 65, § 16-7, at 1454.
216. Johnson, From Medicalization to Legalization to Politicization: O'Connor, Cruzan, and Re-
fusal of Treatment in the 1990's, 21 CONN. L. REV. 685 (1989).
217. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
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terest groups. But third, and I suggest most importantly from the per-
spective of this article, the state as the embodiment of the collective
political will of its citizens has no real or legitimate interest in such
Orwellian medical practice. Although it may be difficult to motivate citi-
zens to rise up in righteous indignation when an isolated patient ran-
domly finds his treatment decision challenged in court by his physician,
it would be quite another matter to attempt to systematically subject all
patient refusals with serious consequences to bureaucratic scrutiny and
legal action. Such a proposal would be political martyrdom for the
elected officials who had the temerity to suggest it.
Hopefully, the faith that Justice O'Connor has reposed in the state
legislatures will prove to be well-founded, and instead of the totalitarian
scenario described above, other states will follow the lead of those that
have already recognized the role of the family as surrogate deci-
sionmakers for incompetent patients. 2 18 Such statutes can be drafted so
that individual and family privacy in healthcare decisions is preserved
and protected without unduly compromising the legitimate role and re-
sponsibility of the state as parens patriae when actual cases of abuse or
neglect of an incapacitated person are presented.
V. CONCLUSION
Ivan Illich attacks the phenomenon of iatrogenic disease or illness
that results from medical interventions. 2 19 Since virtually all medical
procedures carry risks of adverse consequences, all medications have
one or more negative side-effects, and hospitalization presents the pos-
sibility of nosocomial infections, medication errors, and other untoward
patient incidents, they must be factored into any objective analysis of the
impact of medical interventions. Such outcomes are the antithesis of the
Hippocratic admonition that before all else the physician should do no
harm. Illich's contention is that the increasing medicalization of society
has the potential for causing more harm than benefit. Regardless of the
extent to which one accepts this proposition, it can also be said that
there has occurred a parallel and simultaneous process-the legalization
of medical practice. It is quite common for hospitals, once they reach a
certain critical mass, to establish in-house legal staffs. Also, as physi-
cians increasingly practice in group settings, in the form of large clinics,
HMO's, or as actual employees of hospitals, their interactions with attor-
neys and reliance, if not dependence, upon legal advice in rendering
patient care has significantly increased. One area in which the advice
and counsel of attorneys has been increasingly sought and followed is
that of treatment refusals by patients or their families.
Just as physicians have a role as "gatekeeper" in modern healthcare
218. For examples of progressive legislation intended to cover situations such as that
in the Cruzan case, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107.
219. I. ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS (1975). "latrogenic" is derived from the Greek roots
"iatros", meaning "doctor" and "genic" meaning "arising from". latrogenic illness
means one caused by a physician.
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delivery, counsel to hospitals and physicians are, in a very real sense, the
gatekeepers with regard to the legal system in general and the courts in
particular. This role has come under increasing scrutiny and criticism of
late. 220 The practice of defensive health law has often translated into
the seeking ofjudicial involvement whenever there is a conflict between
the physician's recommendation and the patient's decision. Virtually all
of the cases discussed in this article, including Cruzan, were precipitated
by the refusal of healthcare providers-physicians, hospitals, or nursing
homes-to accept the informed refusal of treatment by competent pa-
tients or the guardians or close family members of incompetent patients.
Few, if any, of these cases posed any actual and material threat of liabil-
ity to those healthcare providers that legally or ethically justified litigat-
ing the refusal of treatment.
Nevertheless, represented by counsel, private medical treatment de-
cisions became public legal controversies, in some instances with nu-
merous amicus briefs filed on both sides of the issue. Since few, if any,
courts have ever refused to hear and rule upon these cases, it is not
surprising that they proliferate. Unless the more egregious cases are
dismissed with a finding that the providers were engaging in groundless
and frivolous litigation, no attorney for a health care provider will be
able to conscientiously advocate not resolving such disputes through the
courts.
The practice of defensive clinical and legal medicine, born of the
generally litigious nature of modern American society, in fact produces
yet more litigation of the type addressed in this article-iatrogenic litiga-
tion. The courts, facing overcrowded dockets and being generally ill-
equipped to make the kinds of decisions foisted upon them by hospitals
and physicians, can stem this tide of cases through prompt and judicious
application of existing contractual, procedural, and constitutional prin-
ciples. Furthermore, they have the ethical responsibility to do so. Only
then will the physician-patient relationship have any reasonable chance
of being returned to the realm of the private and personal encounter
that is based on confidentiality and mutual trust and respect.
220. See Nelson & Cranford, Legal Advice, Moral Paralysis, and the Death of Samuel Linares,
17 LAw, MEDICINE, AND HEALTH CARE 316 (1989).

